Yun Liao v. Maurice Junious, 817 F.3d 678

Background

In 2003 a jury convicted Yun Hseng Liao of assault and attempted premeditated murder for hitting his ex‑girlfriend’s son with a hammer; Liao claimed he was sleepwalking and lacked intent.
Trial counsel retained Dr. Clete Kushida, who recommended a medical exam and overnight polysomnogram (sleep study); counsel moved for funding/authorization but a court clerk’s error left the approved order undiscovered and no study was done before trial.
At trial Kushida testified without the recommended exam or sleep study; the prosecutor used that absence to impeach him and the jury heard rebuttal from Dr. Kaushal Sharma who said the evidence was insufficient without a sleep study.
On remand after appellate review, Liao obtained a detailed sleep study by Dr. Milton Erman (with consultation from Dr. Guilleminault) that diagnosed somnambulism based on objective findings (apnea, arousals, EEG, hypnogram, oxygen desaturations) supporting a sleepwalking defense.
The Superior Court found counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to secure the study but concluded (contrary to Liao) that the omission was not prejudicial; federal habeas review followed.
The Ninth Circuit held the Superior Court’s no‑prejudice finding was an unreasonable factual and legal determination under AEDPA/Strickland, and that the conviction was an extreme malfunction of justice; it ordered a conditional writ (release unless retried within 90 days).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to obtain a sleep study	Counsel’s omission deprived Liao of crucial objective medical evidence that would have supported the sleepwalking defense and prevented the damaging impeachment of the defense expert	State conceded counsel’s failure amounted to deficient performance but argued lack of prejudice	Deficient performance conceded; Ninth Circuit affirmed ineffective assistance on performance prong (state court agreed) but reversed as to prejudice under AEDPA review
Whether the Superior Court’s no‑prejudice finding was reasonable under AEDPA/Strickland	The newly obtained objective sleep study would have materially strengthened the defense and created a reasonable probability of a different outcome	Superior Court found lay testimony and Kushida’s testimony sufficient and characterized the new study as cumulative or not exculpatory	The Ninth Circuit held the Superior Court’s no‑prejudice finding was an objectively unreasonable determination of the facts and an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law
Whether the sleep study would have helped or hurt the defense at trial	Study provides objective corroboration (diagnosis and markers) that counsel could have presented, avoiding Kushida’s impeachment	State argued at oral argument (contrary to its brief) that the study might have discredited Kushida and thus be unhelpful	Court found the State’s contention untenable given study’s objective support, and that the study was not merely cumulative but directly probative and likely to have been called earlier by counsel
Appropriate remedy when AEDPA/Strickland violated and petitioner already served sentence	Liao sought relief: retrial or release given constitutional violation and prejudice	State did not dispute the constitutional error but argued lack of prejudice; impracticality of retrial noted because petitioner already served term	Court ordered a conditional writ: release from custody unless California elects to retry within 90 days, with retrial to commence within a reasonable time if elected

Key Cases Cited

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑part test for ineffective assistance: deficient performance and prejudice)
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (AEDPA deference; federal relief only where state decision is contrary or objectively unreasonable)
Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766 (2010) (AEDPA establishes a demanding threshold for federal habeas relief)
Hinton v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 1081 (2014) (failure to obtain expert can be prejudicial where expert testimony would likely have created reasonable doubt)
Brown v. Myers, 137 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 1998) (failure to call corroborating witnesses can create prejudice by leaving defendant with an uncorroborated defense)
Luna v. Cambra, 306 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (same principle: absence of corroboration can render a defense ineffective)