Yulanda Hill v. Carolyn Walker
737 F.3d 1209
| 8th Cir. | 2013Background
- Hill, a Family Service Worker at the Arkansas Department of Human Services, suffered from depression and anxiety exacerbated by job stress; she began employment June 28, 2010.
- In May 2011 Hill requested removal from a particularly stressful case, reported anxiety/panic attacks, obtained a doctor’s note covering May 25–June 20, and asked to use accrued compensatory time.
- Department initially approved use of compensatory time and provided unspecified "FMLA paperwork," but later determined Hill was ineligible for FMLA because she had been employed less than 12 months.
- Supervisor Walker rescinded approval for all requested leave as an unreasonable burden on the agency and demanded Hill return June 6; Hill did not return and was terminated June 17 for failing to comply with work instructions.
- Hill sued Walker (individually and officially) and the Department under the FMLA, FLSA, ADA, and the Rehabilitation Act; district court dismissed FMLA and FLSA claims and granted summary judgment for defendants on ADA/Rehab Act claims. Court of Appeals affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| FMLA eligibility/interference | Hill alleges termination prevented her from becoming FMLA-eligible and interfered with exercise of FMLA rights | Hill had not been employed 12 months and thus lacked FMLA rights | Dismissed: Hill was not an "eligible employee" under FMLA; no estoppel alleged that would alter eligibility |
| FLSA — individual liability for unpaid compensatory time | Walker refused payment of accrued compensatory time, so liable individually under FLSA | Walker not alleged to have controlled pay decisions; individual liability requires personal responsibility for violation | Dismissed: complaint did not sufficiently plead Walker’s personal responsibility |
| ADA/Rehab Act — failure to accommodate/disability discrimination | Hill requested removal from a stressful case as accommodation; removal was necessary to perform job | Handling stressful cases is an essential function; employer offered alternative accommodations; removing function unreasonable | SJ for defendants: Hill could not perform essential functions with reasonable accommodation; removal was not reasonable |
| ADA/RA — retaliation for requesting accommodation | Termination shortly after June 7 letter creates inference of retaliation for protected request | Termination based on failure to return to work; contemporaneous legitimate reason undermines temporal inference | SJ for defendants: no genuine dispute — temporal proximity insufficient given employer’s contemporaneous nondiscriminatory reason |
Key Cases Cited
- Pulczinski v. Trinity Structural Towers, Inc., 691 F.3d 996 (8th Cir.) (describing FMLA interference/retaliation principles)
- Duty v. Norton-Alcoa Proppants, 293 F.3d 481 (8th Cir.) (employer estoppel to contest FMLA eligibility where employer guaranteed leave)
- Darby v. Bratch, 287 F.3d 673 (8th Cir.) (discussing potential for individual liability under FLSA)
- Riordan v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690 (7th Cir.) (individual FLSA liability requires personal responsibility for violation)
- Kallail v. Alliant Energy Corp. Servs., Inc., 691 F.3d 925 (8th Cir.) (ADA accommodation/interactive process principles)
- Fenney v. Dakota, Minn. & E. R.R. Co., 327 F.3d 707 (8th Cir.) (definition of "qualified individual" and essential functions)
- Heisler v. Metro. Council, 339 F.3d 622 (8th Cir.) (retaliation claim available where employee in good-faith seeks accommodation)
- Pereda v. Brookdale Senior Living Cmties., Inc., 666 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir.) (pre-eligibility FMLA request protection reasoning discussed)
- Sprenger v. Federal Home Loan Bank of Des Moines, 253 F.3d 1106 (8th Cir.) (temporal proximity alone insufficient to prove retaliation when employer offers contemporaneous legitimate reason)