Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. Texas
596 U.S. 685
SCOTUS
2022

Background:

  • The Ysleta del Sur Pueblo (near El Paso) received federal recognition in 1968; Texas initially held federal trust responsibilities but renounced them in 1983, prompting the Tribe to seek restoration.
  • Congress enacted the Ysleta del Sur and Alabama and Coushatta Indian Tribes of Texas Restoration Act (1987), restoring federal trust status and §107(a) "prohibit[ing]" on-reservation any gaming activities that Texas law prohibits, while §107(b) disclaims granting Texas civil/criminal regulatory jurisdiction and §107(c) vests federal courts with exclusive jurisdiction to enforce subsection (a).
  • Six months earlier the Supreme Court decided California v. Cabazon Band (1987), adopting a prohibitory/regulatory distinction for state gaming laws under Pub. L. 280: genuinely prohibitory laws can be applied on tribal land, regulatory laws cannot.
  • Congress then enacted IGRA (1988), which distinguishes class II gaming (e.g., bingo—permitted where the State permits such gaming generally) from class III gaming (requires tribal-state compacts).
  • The Fifth Circuit in Ysleta I (36 F.3d 1325) held §107 made the entirety of Texas gaming laws and regulations operate as surrogate federal law on the reservation; lower courts applied that broad reading in subsequent disputes.
  • In 2016 the Tribe opened bingo/electronic-bingo operations; Texas sued to shut them down. The District Court enjoined the Tribe (stayed pending appeal); the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed Ysleta I (955 F.3d 408). The Supreme Court vacated and remanded, holding §107 bans only gaming activities that Texas law actually prohibits (not merely regulates).

Issues:

Issue Plaintiff's Argument Defendant's Argument Held
Scope of §107(a): does it federalize all Texas gaming laws/regulations or only games Texas fully bans? Tribe: §107 bans only gaming activities that Texas flatly prohibits; regulatory rules do not become surrogate federal law. Texas: §107 and the tribal resolution mean all Texas gaming laws/regulations apply on the reservation. Held: §107 federalizes only those gaming activities that Texas law actually prohibits; regulatory state rules are not made surrogate federal law.
Role of Cabazon/Public Law 280 prohibitory vs regulatory distinction Tribe: Cabazon’s distinction governs and supports limiting §107 to prohibitions. Texas: §107 should be read on its terms to impose broader state-law constraints. Held: Cabazon is a controlling contextual precedent and Congress’s timing/wording shows it adopted the prohibitory/regulatory framework.
Interaction with IGRA and class II bingo (including electronic bingo) Tribe: IGRA permits class II bingo where a State permits the game generally; Tribe may run class II bingo without state approval. Texas: Restoration Act displaced IGRA for this Tribe and requires compliance with Texas bingo regulations. Held: Restoration Act does not displace IGRA; games not prohibited by Texas remain subject to tribal regulation and federal law (including IGRA where applicable).
Jurisdiction/enforcement under §§107(b)–(c): can Texas enforce regulations in state court or must enforcement be in federal court? Tribe: §107(b) denies Texas regulatory jurisdiction; §107(c) vests federal courts with exclusive jurisdiction over subsection (a) violations. Texas: §107(b) should be read to allow state enforcement or to require federal courts to enforce state regulations. Held: §107(b) bars state civil/criminal regulatory jurisdiction over §107 matters and §107(c) gives federal courts exclusive enforcement authority for prohibited activities; Texas’s broader reading would make subsections surplusage.

Key Cases Cited

  • California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987) (established prohibitory/regulatory distinction for state gaming laws under Pub. L. 280)
  • Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. Texas, 36 F.3d 1325 (5th Cir. 1994) (Fifth Circuit held Restoration Act made Texas gaming laws and regulations operate as surrogate federal law on the reservation)
  • Texas v. Ysleta del Sur Pueblo, 955 F.3d 408 (5th Cir. 2020) (Fifth Circuit reaffirmed Ysleta I and upheld injunction against Tribe’s bingo operations)
  • Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561 (1995) (canon against ascribing overlapping meanings to different statutory terms)
  • Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303 (2009) (statutory-construction canon that all provisions should be given effect)
  • Ryan v. Valencia Gonzales, 568 U.S. 57 (2013) (presumption that Congress legislates with knowledge of relevant Supreme Court precedents)
  • Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976) (background on limits of state jurisdiction over tribes under Pub. L. 280)
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