741 S.E.2d 515
S.C.2013Background
- Child, born 2006, is the youngest of five siblings; DSS removed children from biological parents in 2007; Child placed in foster care with Youngbloods; siblings placed with other foster families; April 2008 DSS informed Youngbloods that adoption was permanent plan and that siblings would be prioritized for adoption if together; Youngbloods applied and were approved for general adoption but not for Child specifically; March 2009 DSS notified Youngbloods they were not selected and Child placed with Does; four overlapping actions filed: DSS TPR, Youngbloods’ administrative appeal, Youngbloods’ adoption action, Does’ adoption action; August 2009 Child placed with Does, and visitation with siblings arranged; May 2010 Does’ adoption order for four siblings; 2012 appellate history involved whether Youngbloods had standing; court ultimately vacated Youngbloods’ adoption petition and remanded custody to DSS for adoptive placement.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Youngbloods had standing to petition to adopt | Youngbloods relied on 63-9-60 to obtain standing. | 63-9-60(B) bars standing for a child placed by DSS; alternative theories fail. | Youngbloods lacked statutory standing; no constitutional standing found. |
| Whether consent by DSS was required and whether lack of consent affected standing | If standing existed, DSS’s denial of consent would sustain review under 63-9-310(D). | 63-9-310(D) does not apply to Youngbloods; no statutory or constitutional right to review. | Consent issue not reached due to lack of standing. |
| Effect of 63-9-60 on who may petition when DSS places child for adoption | 63-9-60 should allow former foster parents to petition. | Statute plainly limits standing for children placed by DSS. | Statute does not permit standing for DSS-placed child adoptions. |
| Whether due process or public-importance exception could create standing | Public importance could permit standing. | No statutory or constitutional basis; foster relationship insufficient for standing. | No due process/public-importance standing recognized. |
Key Cases Cited
- Michael P. v. Greenville County Department of Social Services, 385 S.C. 407, 684 S.E.2d 211 (Ct.App.2009) (former foster parents lacked standing under 63-9-60 when child placed by DSS for adoption)
- Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 97 S.Ct. 2094, 53 L. Ed. 2d 14 (U.S. 1977) (foster care relationship not per se legally protected)
- ATC South, Inc. v. Charleston County, 380 S.C. 191, 669 S.E.2d 337 (S.C. 2008) (constitutional standing framework for injury-in-fact)
- S.C. Dept. of Social Services v. Futch, 335 S.C. 598, 518 S.E.2d 591 (S.C. 1999) (standing/due process considerations in DSS actions)
- Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 533 S.E.2d 578 (S.C. 2000) (statutory interpretation with unambiguous language)