Young v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
828 F.3d 26
| 1st Cir. | 2016Background
- Susan K. Young refinanced her Massachusetts home in 2006; Wells Fargo was trustee and Homeward the servicer.
- Young fell behind on payments in 2007–2008; Homeward solicited and she signed a forbearance agreement in Sept. 2008 with increased payments.
- In Oct. 2009 Young applied for a HAMP modification and entered a Trial Period Plan (TPP) requiring three reduced trial payments, with a permanent modification due Feb. 1, 2010 if trial payments were timely.
- Two trial payments were received slightly late; Homeward initially sent a rejection letter (Jan. 13, 2010) then a representative admitted the rejection was a mistake and said a modification would arrive within weeks.
- Homeward later offered a non‑HAMP traditional modification in June 2010 with terms Young rejected as unfavorable; she sent a Chapter 93A demand to Homeward and sued after foreclosure proceedings began.
- On remand from this court (Young I), the district court granted summary judgment for defendants on breach of contract, Chapter 93A, and derivative equitable claims; Young appeals and this Court affirms.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Breach of contract: whether defendants breached the TPP by failing to provide a permanent HAMP modification | Young: she performed TPP payments and was entitled to a permanent modification; defendants failed to timely provide one | Defendants: Young’s trial payments were untimely (material breach) and Young cannot prove contract damages | Affirmed for defendants—Young fails to prove damages; summary judgment proper (court need not decide material‑breach issue because damages failure is dispositive) |
| Damages for breach: whether Young adduced evidence of contract damages | Young: incurred penalties, fees, and pre‑suit legal expenses; trial payments constitute damages | Defendants: fees were waived, legal help was pro bono or predates TPP, trial payments were preexisting obligations | Held for defendants—Young’s evidence is vague/insufficient; trial payments not a new damage item |
| Chapter 93A claim vs. Wells Fargo: whether Young’s demand letter to Homeward sufficed for Wells Fargo | Young: Homeward’s conduct supports Chapter 93A claim against both via agency/respondeat superior | Defendants: statutory demand letter must identify defendant and describe unfair acts; Wells Fargo wasn’t mentioned | Affirmed for defendants—demand letter did not put Wells Fargo on notice; summary judgment for Wells Fargo |
| Chapter 93A claim vs. Homeward: whether Homeward’s actions were unfair/deceptive and caused economic injury | Young: Homeward gave inconsistent/misleading information, failed to send HAMP modification, and harmed her economically | Homeward: conduct was at most negligent; Young offers no evidence of separate, identifiable economic harm caused by Homeward | Affirmed for defendants—allegations show negligence, not the egregious misconduct Chapter 93A requires; no causal economic injury shown |
Key Cases Cited
- Young v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 717 F.3d 224 (1st Cir. 2013) (prior appeal addressing TPP as contract and pleading issues)
- Teragram Corp. v. Marketwatch.com, Inc., 444 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2006) (contract interpretation is ordinarily a question of law)
- Brooks v. AIG SunAmerica Life Assurance Co., 480 F.3d 579 (1st Cir. 2007) (elements required to prove breach of contract)
- Pierce v. Clark, 851 N.E.2d 450 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006) (rule of damages in breach of contract actions)
- Passatempo v. McMenimen, 960 N.E.2d 275 (Mass. 2012) (demand‑letter requirements under Chapter 93A and notice sufficiency)
- Klairmont v. Gainsboro Rest., Inc., 987 N.E.2d 1247 (Mass. 2013) (negligent acts alone do not violate Chapter 93A)
- Cadle Co. v. Hayes, 116 F.3d 957 (1st Cir. 1997) (deposition testimony can support or defeat summary judgment)