Young v. Npas, Inc.
361 F. Supp. 3d 1171
D. Utah2019Background
- Robyn Young, a public-school teacher injured at work, received medical treatment at St. Mark's Hospital (HCA) and filed a workers' compensation claim asserting her employer (Granite School District) — not she — was liable for medical bills.
- Six medical accounts arose; NPAS handled “early-out” services and Medicredit handled later collections; four accounts were actively pursued by Medicredit and six appeared in NPAS records. Consent-for-care forms notified patients that an EBO servicer could handle billing and that the provider could later deem accounts "in default."
- Medicredit maintained a merged, omnibus consumer file (single consumer ID) and imported NPAS collection notes when accounts transferred; many Medicredit entries flagged accounts as work‑comp or in litigation.
- Despite work‑comp indicators and attorneys’ letters, NPAS and Medicredit repeatedly contacted Young (many phone calls and letters), including after counsel notified them of representation in some instances.
- Procedural posture: cross-motions for partial summary judgment and related motions. Court granted summary judgment in part for Young against Medicredit (multiple FDCPA violations) and in part against NPAS as to account 4683; denied NPAS’s motion; denied defendants’ motion to preclude actual damages; denied Young’s motion to amend complaint.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Medicredit violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1) by collecting debts not permitted by law | Young: Utah workers’ comp law makes employer — not employee — responsible for medical bills, so collection attempts were unlawful | Medicredit: disputes either knowledge that accounts were work‑comp or that state law barred collection; argues lack of disputed material facts | Court: Medicredit is charged with knowledge from its records and violated §1692f(1) each time it contacted Young about the four accounts (strict‑liability alternative also supports liability) |
| Whether Medicredit violated § 1692e(2)(A) and § 1692e(10) (misrepresenting debt) | Young: attempts to collect from a non‑debtor and letters creating false impression that she owed are misrepresentations | Medicredit: contends facts and intent disputed | Court: Medicredit violated §1692e(2)(A) and §1692e(10) by attempting collection and sending letters implying Young was obligated to pay |
| Whether NPAS is a "debt collector" under 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) | Young: NPAS regularly and by principal purpose collects debts for hospitals (early‑out collections); thus it is a debt collector | NPAS: argues it only handled non‑defaulted accounts or worked as an EBO and thus falls outside the FDCPA definition | Court: NPAS is a debt collector as a matter of law (both "regularly" and "principal purpose" prongs); at minimum account 4683 was in default when NPAS obtained it, so FDCPA applies to that account |
| Whether NPAS violated FDCPA as to account 4683 (1692f(1), 1692e, 1692e(10), 1692c(a)(2), 1692c(c)) | Young: NPAS sent collection letter stating she was obligated to pay and thus violated multiple FDCPA provisions | NPAS: contends disputes about default status and attorney‑representation notice preclude summary judgment | Court: Summary judgment for Young on account 4683 for §1692f(1), §1692e(2)(A), §1692e(10); questions remain on §1692c(a)(2) and §1692c(c) so summary judgment denied on those provisions |
| Whether Young can recover "actual damages" for emotional distress under FDCPA | Young: emotional distress caused by collection calls/letters; can recover actual damages without meeting state IIED standards | Defendants: damages vague and not sufficiently tied to FDCPA violations; move for summary judgment on actual damages | Court: Denied defendants’ motion; plaintiff offered testimony and corroboration sufficient to create genuine dispute on emotional‑distress damages (treats FDCPA damages standard independent of state IIED law) |
| Whether Plaintiff may amend complaint after scheduling order deadline | Young: sought to add claims/parties after deadline | Defendants: oppose for lack of good cause | Court: Denied — plaintiff failed to show Rule 16(b) good cause |
Key Cases Cited
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (summary judgment standard and material fact definition)
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (summary judgment burdens of proof)
- Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Sea Harvest Seafood Co., 251 F.3d 1294 (10th Cir. 2001) (viewing evidence and inferences in favor of nonmoving party)
- Johnson v. Riddle, 305 F.3d 1107 (10th Cir. 2002) (interpreting "permitted by law" in §1692f(1) and looking to state law)
- James v. Wadas, 724 F.3d 1312 (10th Cir. 2013) (factors for determining "regularly" engages in debt collection)
- Alibrandi v. Financial Outsourcing Services, Inc., 333 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2003) (treatment of "default" for FDCPA exclusion)
- Helton v. AT & T Inc., 709 F.3d 343 (4th Cir. 2013) (corporations charged with knowledge of corporate records)
- Llewellyn v. Allstate Home Loans, Inc., 711 F.3d 1173 (10th Cir. 2013) (proof required to show emotional‑distress actual damages under consumer statutes)
- Mavris v. RSI Enterprises Inc., 86 F. Supp. 3d 1079 (D. Ariz. 2015) ("reasonable person" test and factors for determining whether creditor viewed debt as in default)