Young v. Illinois Human Rights Commission, 974 N.E.2d 385

Young, a homosexual, was hired June 30, 2006 as a City of Chicago laborer and faced disciplinary actions by Supervisor McKennie, including a two-day suspension.
On October 24, 2008, the City terminated Young after she was absent for three weeks while imprisoned for unrelated charges.
On November 10, 2008, Young filed a discrimination charge alleging denial of overtime, a reprimand and two-day suspension, and discharge due to sexual orientation.
The Illinois Department of Human Rights dismissed the charge for lack of substantial evidence; Young sought review, and the Commission remanded for further investigation before again dismissing the charge.
The Commission ultimately held there was no substantial evidence that Young was discriminated against based on sexual orientation, and the appellate court reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard.
The court applied a three-prong prima facie test for discrimination and reviewed whether the actions were material adverse and whether the proffered nondiscriminatory reasons were pretextual.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was Young denied overtime due to sexual orientation?	Young contends overtime denialSeverity favors nonhomosexuals.	City shows overtime parity with similarly situated workers.	No substantial evidence of discriminatory denial of overtime.
Were the reprimand and two-day suspension discriminatory?	Discipline was prompted by her sexual orientation.	Disciplinary action based on interference with work performance.	No substantial evidence of discrimination in the discipline.
Was Young discharged because of sexual orientation?	Discharge was motivated by sexual orientation.	Discharge justified under attendance policy and behavior issues.	No substantial evidence of discriminatory discharge.
What standard of review applies to Commission decisions under the 2008 amendment?			Abuse of discretion applies.
Did the Commission properly evaluate the evidence on retaliation/harassment claims outside the scope of the charge?	Raising harassment/retaliation issues should be considered.	Harassment/retaliation outside the scope of the charge is not reviewable.	Claims outside scope were properly not considered.

Owens v. Department of Human Rights, 403 Ill. App. 3d 899 (2010) (three-prong prima facie test; adverse action required; abuse of discretion standard)
Zaderaka v. Illinois Human Rights Comm’n, 131 Ill. 2d 172 (1989) (establish elements of unlawful discrimination)
Sola v. Human Rights Comm’n, 316 Ill. App. 3d 528 (2000) (ambiguous or stray remarks insufficient without causal link)
In re Toledo, 312 Ill. App. 3d 131 (2000) (Act does not forbid favoritism unless based on protected status)
Hoffelt v. Department of Human Rights, 367 Ill. App. 3d 628 (2006) (materially adverse action standard; significant change in employment)
Lewis v. City of Chicago, 496 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2007) (material adverse action; comparative overtime analysis)
Owens v. Department of Human Rights, 403 Ill. App. 3d 899 (2010) (reaffirmation of abuse-of-discretion review and prima facie framework)