Young v. Herman
2018 IL App (4th) 170001
| Ill. App. Ct. | 2018Background
- In December 2015 Crystal and Michael Young (grandmother and step-grandfather) filed a petition under section 601.2 seeking allocation of parental decision-making for J.H., Crystal’s granddaughter, alleging they had provided primary care for J.H. since infancy and that J.H. had been recently removed from their care by the mother, Kourtney Herman.
- The trial court entered an emergency order returning J.H. to the Youngs’ care, later modified to allow limited visitation for Kourtney; the Youngs then sought permanent allocation of decision-making responsibilities.
- Kourtney moved to dismiss under 735 ILCS 5/2-615 and 2-619, arguing the Youngs lacked standing because J.H. was in Kourtney’s physical custody when the petition was filed.
- The court held six evidentiary hearings (July–Oct. 2016). Testimony showed J.H. spent most nights with the Youngs for several years, the Youngs arranged and paid for much of her care (education, medical, extracurricular), and Kourtney had voluntarily ‘‘coparented’’ by transferring many duties to Crystal beginning ~2007.
- The trial court found the Youngs had effectively been primary caregivers, concluded J.H. was not in Kourtney’s "physical custody" at the time of filing, and awarded primary decision-making responsibility to the Youngs (with limited parenting time to Kourtney).
- On appeal, the Fourth District affirmed, holding (1) the statutory nonparental custody limitation is an element of the petitioner’s claim (not traditional standing) and (2) the trial court’s findings on physical custody and best interests were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Issues
| Issue | Youngs' Argument | Kourtney's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether nonparent petitioners satisfied the statutory prerequisite that the child was not in a parent’s "physical custody" when petition filed | J.H. was effectively in the Youngs’ care for years; she was removed only shortly before filing, so the statutory prerequisite was met | J.H. was physically with Kourtney at filing, so the Youngs could not invoke §601.2 and petition must be dismissed | The requirement is an element the petitioner must plead/prove; trial court reasonably found Kourtney had voluntarily relinquished custody and J.H. was not in Kourtney’s physical custody at filing (affirmed) |
| Whether the allocation of primary decision-making to the Youngs was in the child’s best interests | The Youngs provided long-term stability, medical, educational, and extracurricular care; awarding them primary responsibility served J.H.’s needs | Kourtney argued evidence was improperly considered/ignored and the court misweighed factors; decision to favor Youngs was against manifest weight | Trial court evaluated statutory best-interest factors, credited witnesses for Youngs, and its allocation was not against the manifest weight of the evidence (affirmed) |
Key Cases Cited
- In re R.L.S., 218 Ill. 2d 428, 844 N.E.2d 22 (Illinois 2006) (interpreting nonparent petitions and the statutory prerequisite for custody proceedings)
- In re Petition of Kirchner, 164 Ill. 2d 468, 649 N.E.2d 324 (Illinois 1995) (discussing limits of custody/status in nonparent petitions)
- In re Custody of Peterson, 112 Ill. 2d 48, 491 N.E.2d 1150 (Illinois 1986) (addressing nonparent burden to show child not in parent’s physical custody)
- In re A.W.J., 197 Ill. 2d 492, 758 N.E.2d 800 (Illinois 2001) (stating that the §601(b)(2) limitation is a threshold statutory requirement, not traditional standing)
- In re Custody of McCuan, 176 Ill. App. 3d 421, 531 N.E.2d 102 (Ill. App. 1988) (noting the nonparent bears burden to show absence of parental physical custody)
- In re Custody of M.C.C., 383 Ill. App. 3d 913, 892 N.E.2d 1092 (Ill. App. 2008) (explaining that physical possession at filing alone does not establish legal physical custody)