Young v. Burleigh Morton Detention Center, 953 N.W.2d 597

Laron Young, an inmate at Burleigh Morton Detention Center (BMDC), had multiple telephone calls with his attorney recorded because the attorney’s number was not registered as a "private" number on the facility’s Reliance telephone system.
Reliance Telephone operates BMDC’s inmate phone system; non-privileged numbers are automatically recorded and stored.
Young sued BMDC and Reliance asserting (1) a Sixth Amendment violation (attorney-client calls recorded and stored) and (2) violation of N.D.C.C. § 12-44.1-14(1) (right to confidential access to attorneys).
The district court dismissed claims against Reliance for lack of jurisdiction and granted summary judgment to BMDC, finding Young failed to allege prejudice or a knowing government intrusion and that BMDC’s practice of allowing inmates or attorneys to register private numbers was consistent with the statute.
Young appealed; the North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed summary judgment de novo and affirmed BMDC’s judgment.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether recording and retention of inmate-attorney calls violated the Sixth Amendment	Young: recording/warehousing attorney-client calls inherently violated his right to counsel	BMDC: No evidence government listened to or used recordings; no demonstrated prejudice or knowing intrusion	Affirmed for BMDC — no alleged facts showing knowing intrusion or demonstrable/substantial prejudice
Whether BMDC violated N.D.C.C. § 12-44.1-14(1) (confidential access to attorneys) by requiring attorneys’ numbers be provided/registered and by recording calls	Young: statute imposes on facility the duty to ensure attorney calls are not monitored and to obtain/verify attorney numbers	BMDC: Facility’s policy of allowing inmates or attorneys to register private numbers satisfies the statute; statute is subject to reasonable facility administration requirements	Affirmed for BMDC — statute doesn’t require affirmative identification by facility; registration policy is permissible
Whether violation of Department "Standards" (Standard 84) establishes a statutory violation	Young: recording calls contravened Department standards and thus violated statutory duties	BMDC: Standards are Departmental rules, not statutory provisions or administrative rules under the APA; breach of standards doesn’t automatically equal statutory violation	Affirmed for BMDC — standards are not statutory; alleged standard violation does not establish violation of § 12-44.1-14

State v. Clark, 570 N.W.2d 195 (N.D. 1997) (recognizes attorney-client privacy and requires prejudice or use by government for Sixth Amendment violation when calls are monitored)
Ellis v. State, 660 N.W.2d 603 (N.D. 2003) (Sixth Amendment violation requires knowing intrusion plus demonstrable prejudice or substantial threat of prejudice)
Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 (U.S. 1985) (government must not act to circumvent the right to counsel)
Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (U.S. 1977) (post-arrest actions interfering with counsel do not per se violate Sixth Amendment; prejudice/use required)
United States v. Shapiro, 669 F.2d 593 (9th Cir. 1982) (requires that actions produce evidence offered at trial to constitute deprivation of right to counsel)
State v. Dvorak, 604 N.W.2d 445 (N.D. 2000) (discusses scope of Sixth Amendment right to counsel under state and federal constitutions)
Oien v. Oien, 706 N.W.2d 81 (N.D. 2005) (appellate courts will not consider evidence presented for the first time on appeal)
Golden v. SM Energy Co., 826 N.W.2d 610 (N.D. 2013) (summarizes summary judgment standard on appeal)