Yorie Von Kahl v. Bureau of National Affairs
856 F.3d 106
D.C. Cir.2017Background
- Yorie Von Kahl was convicted in 1983 of murdering two U.S. Marshals and has since publicized his case, filed a 2005 Supreme Court mandamus petition, and attached an excerpted sentencing-hearing transcript to that petition.
- BNA’s Criminal Law Reporter summarized Kahl’s mandamus petition, stating the sentencing judge found Kahl showed “no hint of contrition” and believed the murders were justified; those statements were in fact spoken by the prosecutor, not the judge.
- The excerpted transcript in Kahl’s petition did not identify the prosecutor as the speaker and only named the sentencing judge, which led BNA’s reporter to attribute the statements to the judge.
- After Kahl’s counsel protested in 2007, BNA published a clarification that ambiguously shifted the wording but did not explicitly attribute the statements to the prosecutor; Kahl later demanded a second correction identifying the prosecutor as the speaker.
- Kahl sued BNA for defamation under D.C. law; the district court found Kahl to be a limited-purpose public figure but denied BNA’s summary judgment motion, certifying the actual malice issue for interlocutory appeal.
- The D.C. Circuit reversed, holding (1) Kahl is a limited-purpose public figure, and (2) he failed to produce clear and convincing evidence of actual malice to survive summary judgment; the case was remanded with directions to enter summary judgment for BNA.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Kahl is a limited-purpose public figure | Kahl did not deserve public-figure status for this controversy. | Kahl repeatedly thrust himself into public debate (media interviews, book, website, petition), so he is a limited-purpose public figure. | Kahl is a limited-purpose public figure for issues related to the shootout, anti-tax/anti-government views, and efforts to overturn his conviction. |
| Whether Kahl produced clear and convincing evidence of actual malice to overcome summary judgment | The falsity of BNA’s attribution (judge vs. prosecutor) and BNA’s failure to retract/fully correct supports an inference of actual malice. | BNA reasonably relied on the excerpted transcript in Kahl’s petition, and the initial protest letter did not identify the prosecutor; thus no evidence shows BNA actually knew or recklessly disregarded the truth. | Falsity alone insufficient; given the transcript’s presentation and BNA’s reasonable actions (including a clarification), Kahl failed to show actual malice; summary judgment for BNA required. |
Key Cases Cited
- New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (public officials/figures must prove actual malice to recover for defamation)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (summary judgment standard and clear-and-convincing evidence requirement for public-figure plaintiffs)
- Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (distinction between private and public figures; limited-purpose public figures defined)
- Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657 (1989) (actual malice can be shown by reckless disregard based on circumstantial evidence)
- St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968) (actual malice requires the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts about the truth)
- Jankovic v. Int’l Crisis Grp., 822 F.3d 576 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (three-part test for limited-purpose public figure and discussion of actual malice at summary judgment)