Yongda Huang Harris v. United States of America, 2:16-cv-05606

Harris arrived at LAX from Japan in 2012; CBP placed him in secondary screening and found body armor and luggage containing tactical gear and disturbing media and guides on his laptop. He was arrested and indicted for making false statements on a customs form in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001.
Harris pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement in December 2012 after a change-of-plea colloquy; the plea agreement stipulated a factual basis and a recommended probationary sentence.
At plea, neither the court nor counsel or the plea agreement explained that § 1001’s willfulness element required proof that the defendant knew his conduct was unlawful (the parties and court relied on pre-Bryan Ninth Circuit formulations).
After developments in federal jurisprudence (notably Bryan and the Ajoku litigation), the Ninth Circuit model instruction was revised to require proof that a defendant knew the conduct was unlawful; the government conceded § 1001 now requires that knowledge.
Harris filed a § 2255 petition arguing his plea was not voluntary or intelligent because he was not informed that the government would have to prove he knew his statements were unlawful; he denied awareness of that element and said he would not have pleaded guilty if informed.
The court concluded that neither Harris, counsel, the government, nor the court had apprised Harris of the essential element (knowledge that the conduct was unlawful), so the plea was invalid and the judgment was vacated.

Issue	Harris's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Whether § 1001’s willfulness element requires proof the defendant knew the conduct was unlawful	§ 1001 requires proof of knowledge that the conduct was unlawful; Harris relies on post-Bryan developments	Government conceded after Ajoku that § 1001 requires that knowledge	Court held § 1001 requires proof the defendant knew his conduct was unlawful (joining post-Ajoku view)
Whether Harris’s guilty plea was voluntary and intelligent when he was not informed of that element	Plea was unknowing and involuntary because he was never advised the government must prove he knew the conduct was unlawful; he would not have pled if so informed	Govt argued record supports an inference Harris had the requisite mental state and any omission was harmless	Court held the plea was invalid: failure to inform Harris of an essential element violated due process and Rule 11; plea vacated
Whether the omission was harmless error	Harris argued prejudice because he never admitted that element and contested its existence	Government argued the record shows Harris likely knew it was illegal and thus any error was harmless	Court rejected harmlessness: cannot substitute record in plea context; reversal required absent advisement of essential element

Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184 (Sup. Ct. 1998) (willfulness in criminal statutes generally requires knowledge that conduct was unlawful)
United States v. Ajoku, 718 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2013) (initially held §1035 did not require knowledge; later remanded/vacated and on remand court accepted government concession)
Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (Sup. Ct. 1998) (a plea is subject to collateral attack if not voluntary and knowing)
United States v. Carrier, 654 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1981) (pre-Bryan Ninth Circuit formulation of willfulness as "deliberately and with knowledge")
United States v. Villalobos, 333 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2003) (defendant must be informed of critical elements for plea to be intelligent)
Dominguez Benitez v. United States, 542 U.S. 74 (Sup. Ct. 2004) (Rule 11 error standard and distinction between Rule 11 and due process errors)
Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (a guilty plea is involuntary if the defendant lacked real notice of the true nature of the charge)