Yomtov v. Yomtov, 152 Conn.App. 355

The parties married in 2006 and had two children; dissolution occurred in 2011 with the separation agreement incorporated into the decree.
The plaintiff, a chiropractor, operates Advanced Chiropractic and Wellness, LLC, an LLC.
Section 3.1 requires 45% of the plaintiff's gross annual income from employment for unallocated alimony and child support, starting December 1, 2011.
Section 3.2 defines gross annual income from employment as income actually received by the plaintiff and income he has a right to receive from all sources, including income from one or more businesses.
The plaintiff sought a credit in 2012 for overpayments based on a mistaken belief that business revenue of his LLC, after expenses, should be included in calculating gross annual income.
The trial court denied the motion, interpreting § 3.2 broadly to prohibit deductions for business expenses, and the plaintiff appealed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether 'gross annual income from employment' includes LLC revenue before expenses.	Yomtov argues 3.2 includes only income actually received by him, not LLC revenue gross of expenses.	Yomtov's income equals LLC revenue; deduction of business expenses is not allowed under 3.2.	Contrary to trial court, the language is clear: income means what plaintiff actually receives, not LLC revenue.
Whether the plaintiff may deduct business expenses in calculating gross annual income.	Yomtov should deduct business expenses of his LLC from gross income before applying 45%.	No deduction for business expenses is permitted; 3.2 contemplates gross income without such deductions.	Yes; the plaintiff may deduct the LLC's expenses before determining gross annual income.
Whether Subchapter S language governs the computation of income under 3.2.	Krane-like reasoning not applicable; S-corp language not controlling here since LLC is not an S corporation.	The S-corporation language in 3.2 indicates deductions for business expenses are prohibited.	The Subchapter S language is improper for a non-S corporation; it does not control the interpretation of 3.2.

Eckert v. Eckert, 285 Conn. 687 (2008) (contract interpretation and plenary review of separation agreements)
Nassra v. Nassra, 139 Conn. App. 661 (2012) (contract interpretation principles and intent of parties; ambiguity assessment)
Flaherty v. Flaherty, 120 Conn. App. 266 (2010) (contract interpretation; give effect to all provisions)
Wolosoff v. Wolosoff, 91 Conn. App. 374 (2005) (word meaning and ordinary usage in contract terms)
Krane v. Krane, 99 Conn. App. 429 (2007) (subchapter S language in separation agreements; intent and effect)