Yolanda Chigano v. City of Knoxville, 529 F. App'x 753

On Jan. 31, 2007, M.C., a sophomore special-education student with autism, had her cell phone confiscated at Fulton High pursuant to school policy; the phone was held in the front office and would be released only to a parent.
M.C. refused to leave the office without the phone; school staff, two security officers, and Knoxville Police Officer Tim Riddle tried to get her to leave. A struggle ensued, M.C. was handcuffed and transported to juvenile detention; charges were later dropped.
Plaintiffs (M.C.’s parents and on behalf of M.C.) sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title VI, alleging among other claims that school officials Hatcher and Bianucci violated M.C.’s constitutional rights by summoning police and failing to tell Officer Riddle that M.C. was autistic.
The district court granted summary judgment to Hatcher and Bianucci on the federal claims (dismissing state-law claims without prejudice); Plaintiffs appealed only the § 1983 Fourteenth Amendment substantive due-process claim.
The Sixth Circuit reviewed whether the school employees’ conduct could give rise to liability under the state-created danger variant of DeShaney and whether any constitutional right was clearly established.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Hatcher and Bianucci violated M.C.’s substantive due-process liberty interest by creating or increasing danger to her (state-created danger theory)	Summoning police to the office and failing to inform Officer Riddle that M.C. was autistic created/increased the danger that led to her physical and emotional injuries	Plaintiffs did not plead or develop a DeShaney/state-created danger theory below; moreover, defendants did not affirmatively call the officer and a failure to inform is not an affirmative act creating danger	No constitutional violation: plaintiffs could not show an affirmative act by Hatcher/Bianucci that created/increased a special risk to M.C.; failure to communicate medical/ disability information is not an affirmative act under the doctrine
Whether qualified immunity bars suit because any constitutional right was not clearly established	The deprivation (if any) was based on defendants’ conduct and should be actionable; right to bodily security was implicated	Even if a violation existed, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because the right was not clearly established in these circumstances	Court did not decide qualified-immunity prong because it found no constitutional violation; thus summary judgment affirmed

DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (state’s failure to protect from private violence generally does not violate substantive due process)
Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (Due Process Clause bars certain arbitrary state actions regardless of procedural fairness)
Jones v. Reynolds, 438 F.3d 685 (6th Cir.) (explaining state-created danger elements)
Waters v. City of Morristown, Tenn., 242 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.) (summary-judgment standard on appeal)
Cartwright v. City of Marine City, 336 F.3d 487 (6th Cir.) (failure to act is not an affirmative act under state-created danger theory)
Sargi v. Kent City Bd. of Educ., 70 F.3d 907 (6th Cir.) (school officials’ failure to convey medical info to bus driver not an affirmative act creating danger)
Koulta v. Merciez, 477 F.3d 442 (6th Cir.) (failure to investigate intoxication level not an affirmative act exposing third parties to danger)