Yocum v. Commonwealth, Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board, 2017 Pa. LEXIS 1208

Background

Petitioner Susan A. Yocum, an attorney employed by the Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board, seeks pre-enforcement declaratory and injunctive relief challenging post-employment and solicitation restrictions in 4 Pa.C.S. § 1201(h)(8) & (13).
At hire (2008) the Act barred certain Board employees from soliciting or accepting employment with licensees for defined periods; amendments (2010) expanded and extended prohibitions to two years and explicitly named attorneys and senior officials.
Yocum asserts the restrictions prevent her from seeking/accepting legal employment representing gaming clients and force untenable choices (violate statute; forgo her specialty).
The Board filed preliminary objections arguing lack of standing, ripeness, and that the statutory restrictions are constitutional and consistent with ethics rules.
The Supreme Court overruled the Board’s standing and ripeness objections but, on the merits, held the Gaming Act restrictions do not unconstitutionally invade the Court’s Article V, §10(c) authority to regulate the practice of law.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Standing	Yocum is currently bound by §1201(h)(8) as an employee and faces immediate chilling effect on job-search; therefore she is aggrieved.	Board: restrictions are "post-employment," so Yocum (still employed) hasn’t suffered an injury.	Court: Yocum has standing; the statute’s language and alleged chilling effect make the injury neither remote nor speculative.
Ripeness / Pre-enforcement review	The constitutional question is purely legal and petitioner faces untenable options now; pre-enforcement review is appropriate.	Board: challenge is premature; future events (resignation, statute amendment, different employer) make review speculative.	Court: claim is ripe; pure question of law suitable for pre-enforcement review.
Whether §§1201(h)(8) & (13) impermissibly regulate the practice of law (Art. V §10(c))	Statute functionally bans Yocum from practicing law in her field for two years and infringes this Court’s exclusive rule-making authority over attorneys.	Board: restrictions regulate conduct of all Board employees (not attorneys only) to prevent conflicts; thus not a targeted invasion of the Court’s supervisory power.	Court: upheld statutes — restrictions apply generally to all employees, not specifically to attorneys or the practice of law, so they do not violate Article V §10(c).
Whether Rules of Professional Conduct (e.g., Rule 1.11) preclude statutory regulation	Yocum: Court rules govern practice and conflicts; such statutory restrictions conflict with Court’s authority.	Board: Rules (and Disciplinary Board) are narrower; statutes address non‑attorney roles and conflicts Rules cannot reach.	Court: statutory restrictions are consistent with the Court’s rule authority; Rule 1.11 does not preempt generally applicable statutory measures to prevent conflicts, especially for non‑law employment.

Key Cases Cited

Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013) (pre-enforcement review appropriate for pure legal questions and cases forcing untenable choices)
Shaulis v. Pennsylvania State Ethics Comm’n, 833 A.2d 123 (Pa. 2003) (post‑employment prohibition on representing matters before former agency held unconstitutional when it targeted attorneys/practice of law)
Wajert v. State Ethics Comm’n, 420 A.2d 439 (Pa. 1980) (one‑year bar on former judge appearing before court held to impermissibly restrict practice)
P.J.S. v. State Ethics Comm’n, 723 A.2d 174 (Pa. 1999) (regulation aimed at conduct, applied to all persons, does not infringe Court’s jurisdiction over attorneys)
Maunus v. Commonwealth, State Ethics Comm’n, 544 A.2d 1324 (Pa. 1988) (ethics requirements applied to all public employees upheld where not targeted specifically at attorneys)
Fumo v. City of Philadelphia, 972 A.2d 487 (Pa. 2009) (standing requires substantial, direct and immediate interest in litigation outcome)