Yes on 24-367 Committee v. Deaton, 367 P.3d 937

Background

Plaintiff: a political committee opposing Ballot Measure 24-367 (Aurora Fire District bond) filed suit under ORS 260.532 alleging defendants’ Marion County voters’ pamphlet statement contained a knowingly or recklessly false statement of material fact.
Defendants (Deaton, Stormo, Grant) published a pamphlet line: “This bond levy will DOUBLE the Fire District Tax assessments for the next 20 Years.”
At the time, two fire-district assessments existed: $0.8443 and a local-option $0.49 per $1,000; the measure would add $0.49, increasing total assessments by ~37%, not 100% (i.e., not a doubling of total assessments).
Trial court granted defendants’ special motion to strike under ORS 31.150 (anti‑SLAPP), finding the statement was opinion and that plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence of falsity or of defendants’ knowledge/reckless disregard.
On appeal, the court reviewed whether the statement was factual or opinion, whether plaintiff produced substantial evidence to make a prima facie case under ORS 260.532, and whether the trial court applied the correct anti‑SLAPP standard.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the challenged sentence is an assertion of fact or nonactionable opinion	Statement is an objective, mathematical assertion (doubling) and thus a factual claim	Statement is political opinion and not reasonably read as a provable fact	Held to be a factual assertion, not mere opinion; a reasonable reader would interpret it as stating objective fact
Whether the statement was false under ORS 260.532	The statement is false because the measure would not double total Fire District assessments (would only double the local‑option portion)	The statement can reasonably be read as referring only to the local‑option levy, making it true under that interpretation	Held false as written: it referred to “assessments” (plural) and no context indicated it meant only the local option; thus, at face value it was false
Whether plaintiff presented substantial evidence of defendants’ knowledge or reckless disregard	Plaintiff presented circumstantial evidence (Deaton’s background, his use of his own itemized tax statement) permitting an inference of knowledge or recklessness	Defendants’ affidavit explained they compared the measure to the local‑option tax and thus lacked culpable state of mind	Held plaintiff met the low prima facie burden: reasonable inferences (Deaton’s role, tax statement details) support at least reckless disregard for purposes of ORS 31.150(3)
Whether the trial court properly applied ORS 31.150 when granting the anti‑SLAPP motion	Plaintiff: trial court improperly weighed competing evidence instead of asking only whether plaintiff presented substantial evidence supporting a prima facie case	Defendants: trial court properly considered affidavits and found defendants’ explanation more believable	Held trial court erred by weighing credibility; under ORS 31.150(3) and controlling precedent the court must deny a special motion to strike if plaintiff presents substantial evidence supporting a prima facie case without weighing contrary evidence

Key Cases Cited

Neumann v. Liles, 261 Or. App. 567 (Or. Ct. App.) (describing two‑step burden shifting under ORS 31.150)
Young v. Davis, 259 Or. App. 497 (Or. Ct. App.) (trial court may not weigh competing evidence; plaintiff meets burden by presenting substantial evidence supporting a prima facie case)
Committee of 1000 v. Eivers, 296 Or. 195 (Or. 1984) (ambiguous political statements not actionable if reasonably susceptible to truthful interpretation)
Sumner v. Bennett, 45 Or. App. 275 (Or. Ct. App.) (distinguishing opinion/characterization from provable factual assertions under ORS 260.532)
Obsidian Finance Group, LLC v. Cox, 740 F.3d 1284 (9th Cir.) (contextual test whether contested statement implies provable factual assertion)

Result: Reversed the trial court’s grant of the special motion to strike and remanded for further proceedings.