Ybarra v. State
127 Nev. 47
Nev.2011Background
- Ybarra was sentenced to death in 1981 for the murder of 16-year-old Nancy Griffith; Atkins v. Virginia (2002) barred executing mentally retarded defendants, prompting Nevada to enact NRS 175.554(5) for post‑Atkins claims.
- Ybarra sought relief under NRS 175.554(5) claiming mental retardation; the district court denied relief after a two‑day hearing.
- Ybarra moved to disqualify Judge Dobrescu due to a prior representation of Griffith’s family; the motion was denied.
- The post‑conviction proceedings involved expert testimony on Ybarra’s intellectual functioning and adaptive behavior, with evidence spanning school, military, medical records, and prison writings.
- The Nevada Supreme Court reviewed, de novo on legal questions and with deferential review to the district court’s factual findings, whether Ybarra proved mental retardation and whether the disqualification claim violated due process.
- The court ultimately held: (1) the disqualification was not warranted; (2) Ybarra failed to prove mental retardation under NRS 174.098(7) and that onset occurred during the developmental period; (3) the district court’s mixed‑question review and credibility determinations were appropriate.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Disqualification based on implied bias | Ybarra argues Judge Dobrescu’s prior representation creates implied bias. | Warden asserts no impartiality issues; standard objective test applies. | No due-process violation; the record lacks sufficient facts to question impartiality. |
| Definition and onset period of mental retardation | Ybarra contends evidence shows subaverage functioning and adaptive deficits began before 18. | State contends evidence insufficient; onset before 18 not proven. | Developmental period extends to before age 18; Ybarra did not prove subaverage functioning or adaptive deficits began prior to 18. |
| Standard of review for mental retardation determinations | Court should review for abuse of discretion/clear error. | Court should review as mixed question of fact and law; de novo for legal conclusions. | Mixed-question review applied; district court’s factual findings upheld if supported by substantial evidence; legal conclusions reviewed de novo. |
| Reliance on IQ testing and Flynn effect | Adjusted IQ scores (Flynn effect) support mild mental retardation. | District court considered Flynn evidence but did not rely solely on it; some tests post‑18. | Flynn adjustments not dispositive; 1981 IQ testing occurred after 18, and overall record did not prove mental retardation. |
| Adaptive behavior deficits evidence | Defense evidence shows adaptive deficits before 18. | District court found adaptive deficits not proven; credibility issues with defense experts. | Sufficient substantial evidence supports district court’s finding that adaptive deficits during developmental period were not proven. |
Key Cases Cited
- PETA v. Bobby Berosini, Ltd., 111 Nev. 431, 894 P.2d 337 (1995) (appearance of impropriety and disqualification standards; Canon 2A, 3E)
- People v. Booker, 224 Ill.App.3d 542, 166 Ill. Dec. 252, 585 N.E.2d 1274 (1992) (recusal when impartiality could be questioned; prior relationships considered)
- Rippo v. State, 113 Nev. 1239, 946 P.2d 1017 (1997) (disqualification based on facts, not speculation; appearance of bias)
- Jacobson v. Manfredi, 100 Nev. 226, 679 P.2d 251 (1984) (judge need not disqualify for mere acquaintance; small-town context)
- Stripling v. State, 261 Ga. 1, 401 S.E.2d 500 (1991) (developmental period concepts aligned with clinical definitions)
- In re Brown, 457 F.3d 392 (2006) (APD/clinic definitions; age‑18 onset emphasis)
- Hernandez v. State, Nev. 124 Nev. 60, 188 P.3d 1126 (2008) (mixed question of law and fact standard in mental retardation context)