Yazdchi v. State, 428 S.W.3d 831

In 2000 Yazdchi pleaded guilty to felony theft, received ten years’ imprisonment suspended, and was placed on straight probation (community supervision).
In 2003 the trial judge terminated his supervision early and issued a discharge order permitting him to withdraw his plea, dismissing the indictment and setting aside the conviction under Art. 42.12 § 20(a).
In 2006 Yazdchi committed new felonies (impersonating an attorney and aggregate theft); he was convicted of both in 2010 and elected judge sentencing after a pretrial ruling that he was ineligible for jury-recommended community supervision.
Yazdchi argued his pretrial sworn motion for jury community supervision was proper because, at filing, he had no present conviction (the prior conviction had been set aside), so the resurrection clause in § 20(a)(1) did not bar jury probation.
The trial court refused to submit jury probation and Yazdchi did not testify at trial (counsel said this was because of perceived impeachment exposure); he later raised on appeal the eligibility ruling and a separate impeachment-preservation issue.
The court of appeals upheld the trial court; the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, holding § 20(a)(1) plainly resurrects the earlier set-aside conviction for the limited purpose of probation ineligibility, and Yazdchi failed to preserve his impeachment complaint.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a defendant whose straight-probation conviction was set aside and dismissed may file a sworn pretrial motion for jury community supervision when later tried for a new offense	Yazdchi: filing was proper because at the time of the sworn motion he was not yet reconvicted; the § 20(a) discharge meant he was not a convicted felon until (if ever) a later conviction resurrected it	State: § 20(a)(1) expressly excepts and requires that proof of the prior conviction be made known to the judge if the defendant is again convicted, which resurrects the prior conviction for probation-eligibility purposes	Court: Affirmed — § 20(a)(1) plainly requires the prior discharged conviction be made known and is resurrected for the limited purpose of making the defendant ineligible for jury-imposed community supervision upon subsequent conviction
Whether the trial court’s pretrial ruling deprived Yazdchi of the opportunity to testify because the State could later impeach him with the set-aside conviction, and whether this issue was preserved	Yazdchi: he should be allowed to press the impeachment claim on appeal despite not testifying (invoking Luce)	State: Yazdchi never objected or got a ruling on admissibility of impeachment evidence at trial, so nothing was preserved for appeal	Court: Held the impeachment complaint was not preserved — no specific trial objection or ruling; therefore the Court did not reach the merits

Cuellar v. State, 70 S.W.3d 815 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (explains that a conviction set aside under § 20 may “resurrect” upon subsequent conviction and discusses scope of judicial clemency)
Smiley v. State, 129 S.W.3d 690 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004) (held defendant ineligible for jury probation because set-aside conviction was treated as resurrected at punishment)
Walker v. State, 645 S.W.2d 294 (Tex.Crim.App.1983) (treats judicial-clemency discharge as precluding certain collateral disabilities but is distinguishable on resurrection questions)
Taylor v. State, 612 S.W.2d 566 (Tex.Crim.App.1981) (concludes discharge does not necessarily “wipe the slate clean” for probation eligibility)
Watkins v. State, 572 S.W.2d 339 (Tex.Crim.App.1978) (presidential pardon without express exoneration does not restore probation eligibility)
Ex parte Menchaca, 854 S.W.2d 128 (Tex.Crim.App.1993) (addresses use of prior convictions for impeachment and finality requirements)