Yasund Q. Hancock v. Brent Cape, 875 F.3d 1079

Background

In 2011 inmate Yasund Hancock filed a §1983 suit in the Northern District of Georgia alleging excessive force; the district court granted him leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) under the PLRA and the filing fee was collected in installments.
The district court dismissed the 2011 suit without prejudice in 2014 for failure to exhaust administrative remedies; Hancock appealed, sought IFP for the appeal, was denied as the appeal was frivolous, and the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal for failure to prosecute after Hancock failed to pay the Court of Appeals filing fee.
Hancock refiled the §1983 claim in District Court in September 2014 within six months of terminating the prior suit but after the state two-year statute of limitations had run; he paid the $400 filing fee for the new suit and did not pay costs remaining from the first suit or the denied appeal.
The district court raised Georgia’s renewal statute (O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61), which permits refiling within six months if costs of the original action are paid, and ordered Hancock to show cause why the renewed suit should not be dismissed for unpaid prior costs; Hancock applied for IFP for the renewed suit but the court denied it and dismissed the complaint for failure to pay prior costs.
Hancock appealed; the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Georgia’s cost-payment condition for renewal applies to involuntary dismissals, (2) Hancock cannot invoke or extend Georgia’s “good-faith” exception to avoid payment because he knew of unpaid costs and did not timely seek relief, and (3) federal IFP treatment does not convert or eliminate the state cost-payment requirement under the renewal statute in these circumstances.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does Georgia’s renewal statute’s cost-payment requirement apply when the prior suit was involuntarily dismissed?	Muhammad and the plain text of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-41(d) suggest cost-payment applies only to voluntary dismissals; Hancock relied on state decisions favoring liberal renewal.	Renewal requirement applies equally to involuntary dismissals; allowing otherwise creates perverse incentives and conflicts with Georgia Supreme Court precedent.	The Eleventh Circuit concluded Georgia’s Supreme Court would require payment of prior costs for involuntary dismissals before renewal.
Can Hancock invoke a good-faith exception (Daugherty) to avoid paying prior costs when he was aware of the unpaid costs?	Hancock argued the good-faith exception should be extended to paupers who remain unable to pay and who reasonably believed IFP status excused prior costs.	Cape argued Daugherty covers only those who reasonably thought they had no unpaid costs and that Hancock knew of unpaid costs and had opportunities to inquire/pay.	Court refused to extend Daugherty; Hancock knew of unpaid costs, failed to inquire or pay, and thus cannot rely on the exception.
Does federal IFP status or federal pauper procedure negate Georgia’s state-law cost-payment requirement for renewal?	Hancock argued Georgia’s more generous pauper law would forgive costs and that the renewal statute should be construed to account for pauper protections—i.e., he should be treated as having paid.	Cape argued federal IFP does not relieve state cost obligations, and Hancock never obtained IFP for his appeal (which remained unpaid).	Court held federal IFP status does not eliminate state cost-payment requirement here; Hancock still owed appeal costs and did not invoke Georgia pauper relief timely.
Was dismissal of the renewed suit appropriate where plaintiff paid the new filing fee but not prior costs?	Hancock paid the new filing fee and sought IFP; he argued he reasonably believed prior costs were forgiven.	Cape argued unpaid prior costs bar renewal and dismissal is proper.	Affirmed dismissal for failure to pay costs of the original action; renewal unavailable without satisfying cost-payment condition.

Key Cases Cited

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) (bar on §1983 claims that would imply invalidity of conviction or sentence)
Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985) (choice-of-law and statute-of-limitations principles for §1983 actions)
Clark v. Newsome, 180 Ga. 97 (Ga. 1935) (Georgia renewal statute applies to involuntary dismissals not on the merits)
Couch v. Wallace, 249 Ga. 568 (Ga. 1982) (prepayment of costs required for suits dismissed by operation of law)
Muhammad v. Massage Envy of Ga., Inc., 322 Ga. App. 380 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013) (Court of Appeals narrowly construed § 9-11-41(d) to voluntary dismissals)
Daugherty v. Norville Indus., Inc., 174 Ga. App. 89 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985) (recognized limited good-faith exception when plaintiffs reasonably believed they owed no costs)
McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir. 2008) (discussing accrual and tolling for §1983 claims)