Yassin Aref v. Loretta Lynch
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 15230
| D.C. Cir. | 2016Background
- Three federal prisoners (Aref, Jayyousi, McGowan) were placed for years in Communication Management Units (CMUs), which restrict non-attorney visits (non-contact, monitored, recorded), limit monitored phone/written contact, and reduce privacy compared to general population while still allowing common-area time, programs, and property.
- CMU designation is non-punitive in form, based on convictions, communications-risk, or security concerns; designation decisions involve CTU and an Assistant Director and lacked early formal rulemaking; reviews occur periodically but placement can be indefinite.
- Plaintiffs challenged CMU placement as violating procedural due process (inadequate notice and hearing), Jayyousi alleged First Amendment retaliation for a sermon, and plaintiffs sought damages under the PLRA for program loss, reputational stigma, family harm, and other injuries.
- District court granted summary judgment for the government on due process and retaliation; plaintiffs appealed; one defendant (Leslie Smith) died during litigation; some plaintiffs were later returned to general population but appellate court found mootness inapplicable.
- The D.C. Circuit held (1) CMU designation can create a protected liberty interest because of its selectivity and indefinite duration, so due process adequacy must be examined on remand; (2) Jayyousi’s retaliation claim failed on the merits; and (3) plaintiffs’ non-mental/non-emotional injuries can be compensable under PLRA but individual-capacity claims against Smith fail due to qualified immunity.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether CMU designation creates a protected liberty interest under Sandin | CMU placement imposes atypical, significant hardship (selective placement, indefinite duration, cumulative communication harms) | CMU conditions are less severe than administrative segregation and classification transfers do not create liberty interests | Court: Liberty interest exists because of CMU selectivity and indefinite duration; remand to evaluate process adequacy |
| Whether BOP provided constitutionally adequate process for CMU designation | Plaintiffs: notice and review procedures were inadequate and used flawed/confidential information without meaningful explanation or hearing | BOP: security and predictive judgments justify limited disclosures and minimal process | Court: Process question not decided on appeal; remanded for factual development; only minimal process likely due given deference to prison administrators |
| Whether denial/continuation of CMU placement was First Amendment retaliation (Jayyousi) | Jayyousi: denial was retaliation for protected sermon speech | Government: sermon reasonably viewed as security risk; Turner factors justify action | Court: Affirmed summary judgment for government — no First Amendment violation (Turner factors supported government action) |
| Whether plaintiffs can recover damages under PLRA absent physical injury; and whether individual-capacity defendants are liable | Plaintiffs: injuries (loss of programs, stigma, family harm, First Amendment deprivations) are tangible and recoverable though non-physical | Government: 42 U.S.C. §1997e(e) bars compensatory damages absent physical injury | Court: PLRA bars damages only for "mental or emotional" injury without physical injury; non-mental/non-emotional intangible harms may be compensable; but Smith entitled to qualified immunity so individual-capacity claims dismissed |
Key Cases Cited
- Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995) (liberty interest exists only if conditions impose an "atypical and significant hardship" compared to ordinary incidents of prison life)
- Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 (2005) (placement in supermax with severe, indefinite restrictions can create a liberty interest)
- Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (prison regulations affecting constitutional rights are valid if reasonably related to legitimate penological interests; four-factor test)
- Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (balancing test for procedural due process: private interest, risk of erroneous deprivation and value of additional safeguards, and government interest)
- Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521 (2006) (at summary judgment courts must defer to prison officials on matters of professional judgment unless prisoner shows sufficient contrary evidence)
- Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978) (compensatory damages available for "actual, if intangible" injury caused by constitutional violation)
- Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011) (qualified immunity requires that the unlawfulness of official conduct be clearly established)
- Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) (qualified immunity two-step framework: constitutional violation and clearly established law)
- Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (prisoners retain some due process rights; process may be limited in prison context)
- Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978) (duration of confinement relevant to constitutionality of conditions)