Yaroslav Sklyarsky v. Means-Knaus Partners
777 F.3d 892
| 7th Cir. | 2015Background
- Sklyarsky, a longtime custodian, worked under several contractors; Harvard Maintenance took over in April 2010 and soon began disciplining him.
- He filed multiple administrative complaints with the EEOC and IDHR alleging national-origin discrimination and later retaliation; he was fired by Harvard in January 2013.
- While suing Harvard, Sklyarsky sought to add the building manager, Means-Knaus, as a defendant; Judge Kocoras denied joinder and told him to file a separate suit if he wished.
- Sklyarsky filed a separate suit against Means-Knaus; Judge Gottschall dismissed it sua sponte as claim-precluded because Sklyarsky was already suing Harvard.
- At summary judgment against Harvard, the district court found Sklyarsky failed to prove discrimination (direct or McDonnell Douglas indirect method) and failed to present but-for causation for retaliation; summary judgment was entered for Harvard.
- On appeal the Seventh Circuit held the procedural errors concerning joinder and claim preclusion were mistakes but harmless because the record shows Means-Knaus had no role in the employment decisions; the court affirmed both dismissals.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Sklyarsky could join Means-Knaus / liability of Means-Knaus | Means-Knaus participated with Harvard in discriminatory conduct and therefore should be joined or sued separately | Means-Knaus had no employment contract or role in disciplinary decisions; not an employer or liable third party | Denial of joinder was error but harmless: record shows Means-Knaus had no role; dismissal of Means-Knaus affirmed |
| Whether claim preclusion barred separate suit against Means-Knaus | New suit barred by claim preclusion because same subject was before court | Earlier denial to add Means-Knaus was not a final judgment; separate suit was permitted | Dismissal on claim-preclusion grounds was incorrect, but error was harmless given lack of evidence against Means-Knaus |
| Whether Harvard unlawfully discriminated (direct or indirect proof) | Ridicule of language/multiple reprimands show discriminatory animus or at least create disputed facts on meeting employer’s expectations | Disciplinary records show poor performance/insubordination; no evidence of discriminatory animus sufficient for direct method; Sklyarsky failed to prove he met legitimate expectations for McDonnell Douglas prima facie case | Summary judgment for Harvard affirmed: no direct-evidence of animus and Sklyarsky failed the indirect-method prima facie element of meeting legitimate expectations |
| Whether Harvard retaliated (but-for causation) | Temporal proximity and repeated complaints to EEOC/IDHR establish causation | Timing alone is insufficient; no other evidence shows complaints were the but-for cause of discipline/termination | Summary judgment for Harvard affirmed: suspicious timing without corroborating evidence fails to show but-for causation under Nassar |
Key Cases Cited
- Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074 (7th Cir.) (joint-employer analysis in Title VII context)
- Amcast Indus. Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 45 F.3d 155 (7th Cir.) (finality requirement for preclusive effect of interlocutory rulings)
- Alam v. Miller Brewing Co., 709 F.3d 662 (7th Cir.) (liability of affiliated entities under Title VII)
- Muhammad v. Oliver, 547 F.3d 874 (7th Cir.) (§ 1981 liability for third-party interference with employment relationship)
- Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (U.S. Supreme Court) (retaliation requires but-for causation)
- Brown v. Advocate S. Suburban Hosp., 700 F.3d 1101 (7th Cir.) (McDonnell Douglas prima facie elements and retaliation analysis)