Yarn v. State, 305 Ga. 421

Background

In January 2014, Deondray Yarn and four others, members of One‑Eight‑Trey (a Bloods‑affiliated gang), traveled to kidnap LaJerrius Barfield; Monnie Brabham accompanied Barfield and was shot and killed at a gas station.
Surveillance video, eyewitnesses, ballistic evidence, and testimony established that Yarn and accomplice Gooden exited a vehicle armed, Gooden and Brabham struggled over a shotgun, Gooden shot Brabham, and Yarn fired at Barfield (who escaped).
Roberts, Gooden, and other witnesses testified (some pursuant to plea deals) implicating Yarn; accomplice testimony was corroborated by video, other witnesses, and physical evidence.
Yarn was indicted on multiple counts including malice murder, aggravated assault, armed robbery, gang activity, and firearm possession; a jury convicted him and the trial court imposed life with parole plus consecutive and concurrent terms totaling additional decades.
Yarn appealed, arguing (1) insufficient evidence, (2) trial court erred by granting continuances over his objections, and (3) ineffective assistance because counsel failed adequately to communicate plea‑offer sentencing consequences (consecutive vs. concurrent). The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed.

Issues

Issue	Yarn's Argument	State/Trial Court's Argument	Held
Sufficiency of the evidence for murder, aggravated assault, gang activity, firearm possession	Accomplice testimony was contradictory; contradictions so undermine verdicts that convictions are not supported	Evidence (video, witnesses, ballistics, accomplices corroborating each other) is sufficient; credibility/resolution of conflicts is for the jury	Affirmed: viewing evidence in light most favorable to verdict, a rational jury could convict; corroboration requirements satisfied
Accomplice‑testimony corroboration requirement	Alleged contradictions between accomplices require reversal	Corroboration may be slight/circumstantial and can be supplied by other accomplices, evidence, or video; jury decides credibility	Affirmed: accomplice testimony corroborated by independent evidence and other testimony
Trial court granting continuances (absence of subpoenas)	Continuances improper because OCGA § 17‑8‑25 requires subpoenas for witness‑absence continuances	Trial court acted within discretion under OCGA § 17‑8‑33(a); prior precedent rejects automatic reversal for lack of subpoena	Affirmed: no abuse of discretion in granting continuances given material witnesses in federal custody and controlling precedent
Ineffective assistance re: plea offer communication (consecutive vs concurrent sentences)	Counsel failed to fully explain sentencing consequences; Yarn would have accepted plea but for deficient advice	Counsel communicated the offer (life with parole), warned of risk of life without parole at trial; no record evidence Yarn would have accepted plea	Affirmed: Yarn failed to prove prejudice under Strickland/Lafler—no contemporaneous record showing he would have accepted the plea

Key Cases Cited

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (established standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (ineffective assistance two‑prong test: deficiency and prejudice)
Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (counsel effectiveness in plea‑bargain context; prejudice standard)
Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (defense counsel's role in communicating plea offers)
Bradshaw v. State, 296 Ga. 650 (accomplice testimony corroboration rules under Georgia law)
Threatt v. State, 293 Ga. 549 (corroboration may be slight and need not by itself warrant conviction)
Menzies v. State, 304 Ga. 156 (deference to jury on credibility and conflicts in evidence)
Gramiak v. Beasley, 304 Ga. 512 (plea‑process advice and need for contemporaneous evidence of acceptance)
Parker v. State, 282 Ga. 897 (trial court discretion to grant continuance despite lack of subpoena)
Romer v. State, 293 Ga. 339 (Strickland deficiency discussion in Georgia law)