Yap v. Mooncake Foods, Inc.
146 F. Supp. 3d 552
S.D.N.Y.2015Background
- Plaintiffs allege MCF Chain underpays minimum wage, overtime, and spread-of-hours across four Manhattan restaurants under FLSA and NYLL.
- Defendants include four corporate entities (MCF SoHo, MCF Chelsea, MCF Hell’s Kitchen, MCF FiDi) and three individuals (Peter Lee, Kenny Luong, Amy Luong) controlling operations.
- Plaintiff Yap worked as a deliveryman at MCF Hell’s Kitchen (2011–2012); Plaintiff Sherpa worked as a chef at MCF SoHo (2008–2011).
- Defendants move to dismiss (12(c)) MCF Chelsea and MCF FiDi as employers; motion denied.
- Plaintiffs move for conditional certification of a FLSA collective for hourly employees across all MCF locations; motion granted in part and denied in part.
- Court addresses whether the four locations form a single integrated enterprise, scope of conditional certification (delivery and chefs across all locations), tolling, and notice procedures.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether MCF locations form a single integrated enterprise for FLSA liability | Plaintiffs contend shared ownership/control and centralized payroll show single employer. | Defendants argue separate corporate entities with distinct books and tax IDs negate integration. | Court finds plausible single integrated enterprise at this stage. |
| Whether to conditionally certify a nationwide FLSA collective across all MCF locations | Yap seeks certification for delivery and chefs across all locations based on chain-wide policy. | Defendants oppose broad certification beyond observed locations and roles. | Conditional certification granted for delivery people and chefs across all locations. |
| Whether other employee types beyond delivery and chefs may join the collective | Plaintiffs argue broader employee inclusion is warranted by common policy. | Defendants argue no sufficient showing for other roles. | Inclusion of other employee types denied; only delivery and chefs certified. |
| Whether equitable tolling should apply to opt-in period | Delay in ruling justifies tolling for potential plaintiffs. | Equitable tolling not appropriate at this stage; timeliness reserved for later. | Equitable tolling denied; tolling may be sought by individual plaintiffs upon opt-in. |
| Form and content of court-approved notice and dissemination | Notice should be broad (60-90 days) and posted in workplaces; opt-in to counsel is acceptable. | Disputes over opt-in period length, posting, and where to send forms. | Notice period set at 60 days; notice posted in common areas; opt-in forms to counsel; defense contact information included; jointly revised notice due. |
Key Cases Cited
- Juarez v. 449 Rest., Inc., 29 F. Supp. 3d 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (factors for single integrated enterprise in FLSA)
- Barfield v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 537 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2008) (shared policy concerns; flexible FLSA enterprise concept)
- Sbarro, Inc. v. Sbarro, 982 F. Supp. 249 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (modest factual showing for conditional certification; common policy)