Yang v. Kosinski, 960 F.3d 119

Background:

On April 27, 2020 two Democratic commissioners of the New York State Board of Elections used newly enacted N.Y. Elec. Law § 2-122-a(13) to remove 10 of 11 qualified Democratic presidential candidates (and their pledged delegates) from the June 23 primary ballot, leaving only Joe Biden and effectively canceling the presidential primary.
The Board cited COVID-19 public-health concerns and limited election-administration resources as its justification for omitting candidates who had publicly suspended or terminated campaigns.
Andrew Yang (a suspended candidate), several of his pledged delegates, and intervening Sanders delegates sued, asserting First and Fourteenth Amendment free-speech and associational claims and seeking a preliminary injunction to restore the candidates and hold the primary.
The district court (S.D.N.Y.) granted a preliminary injunction on May 5, 2020 ordering reinstatement and the holding of the primary; the Board appealed.
The Second Circuit affirmed: applying the Anderson–Burdick framework, it found a strong showing of irreparable harm, a clear or substantial likelihood of success on the merits as-applied, and that the equities and public interest favored maintaining the injunction.

Issues:

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether removing qualified candidates and canceling the primary unduly burdens First/14th Amendment associational and speech rights	Yang/delegates: removal prevents them from competing for pledged delegates and from association/voting rights protected by the First Amendment	Board: statute authorizes omission of candidates who publicly suspend; action advances public health and efficient election administration during COVID-19	Court: burden is substantial; as-applied likely unconstitutional under Anderson–Burdick; injunction warranted
Appropriate legal standard for election restriction	Plaintiffs: burden merits close scrutiny under Anderson–Burdick or strict scrutiny if severe	Board: action reasonable and nondiscriminatory, justified by public-health and administrative interests	Court: applied Anderson–Burdick (need not decide strict-scrutiny); plaintiffs likely to prevail even under the flexible test
Adequacy of COVID-19 and resource justifications to permit omission of candidates	Plaintiffs: justifications overbroad and speculative; absentee voting and many counties will still hold contested elections	Board: omitting the presidential primary reduces in-person contacts and conserves limited resources	Court: justifications overstated and insufficient to justify burden; absentee voting and many contested races undermine Board’s public-health/resource claims
Balance of equities and public interest for preliminary relief	Plaintiffs: without injunction their rights to participate and to have delegates attend the national convention will likely be extinguished	Board: administrative burden and public-health risks counsel against reinstating an uncontested primary	Court: equities and public interest favor plaintiffs; cost to State does not override constitutional harms; injunction properly tailored

Key Cases Cited

Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208 (1986) (First Amendment associational freedom is integral to liberty protected by Due Process)
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (associational privacy and freedom principles)
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983) (framework for evaluating burdens on ballot access and political rights)
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992) (balancing test for election regulations; severe burdens trigger strict scrutiny)
Democratic Party of U.S. v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107 (1981) (political party rights to determine nominee-selection processes)
Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee, 489 U.S. 214 (1989) (limits on state regulation of party structure and primaries)
California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000) (cannot excuse unconstitutional restriction because other means of association remain)
Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008) (injunction standards and balancing of equities/public interest)
Faiveley Transp. Malmo AB v. Wabtec Corp., 559 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2009) (standard of review for preliminary injunction legal conclusions)
Mastrovincenzo v. City of New York, 435 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2006) (distinction between mandatory and prohibitory preliminary injunctions)