Yanakos, C., Aplts. v. UPMC, 218 A.3d 1214

Background

In 2003 Christopher donated a lobe of his liver to his mother Susan, who suffered from Alpha-1 Antitrypsin Deficiency (AATD); Christopher alleges pre-op testing showed he had AATD but he was not informed and nonetheless underwent donation.
The transplant occurred in 2003; plaintiffs (Christopher, Susan, and Susan’s husband) filed suit in December 2015 alleging battery/lack of informed consent, medical malpractice, and loss of consortium.
Defendants invoked the MCARE Act’s seven-year statute of repose (40 P.S. §1303.513(a)) as a bar and moved for judgment on the pleadings; the trial court granted the motion.
The Superior Court affirmed, relying on Freezer Storage to hold the legislature may limit or abolish causes of action.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allowance to decide whether the seven‑year repose violates Article I, §11 (the Open Courts / right to a remedy) and whether that infringement survives constitutional scrutiny.
The Supreme Court applied intermediate scrutiny, held the seven‑year statute of repose (with its foreign‑object and minor exceptions) was not substantially related to the government’s important interest in controlling malpractice costs, and reversed and remanded.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does the MCARE seven‑year statute of repose violate Article I, §11 (Open Courts)?	Yanakos: it infringes the constitutionally protected right to a remedy and is subject to heightened review because it bars claims before they accrue for some victims.	Defendants: Open Courts only bars extinguishing already‑accrued/vested claims; MCARE predated conduct so rational‑basis review applies.	Court: It does implicate the important right; intermediate scrutiny applies and the statute is unconstitutional.
What standard of review applies to an Article I, §11 challenge to a statute that limits access to courts?	Yanakos: intermediate scrutiny (or strict) because right to remedy is important.	Defendants: deferential rational basis (or a more deferential "heightened" test).	Court: intermediate scrutiny is appropriate for substantial infringements of the right to a remedy.
Is the seven‑year repose substantially related to the asserted important government interest (controlling malpractice insurance/costs)?	Yanakos: No — legislature offered no evidence connecting seven years to actuarial predictability; the foreign‑object exception shows arbitrariness.	Defendants: statute protects insurers and reduces stale claims; exceptions are reasonable.	Court: Defendants failed to show a substantial relation; the statute (with exceptions) does not yield actuarial certainty and is unconstitutional.
Procedural/relief question: Was judgment on the pleadings proper given the statute of repose defense?	Yanakos: plaintiffs pleaded facts showing discovery after seven years; constitutionality question controls whether pleading could survive.	Defendants: repose bars recovery as a matter of law.	Court: On the pleadings, because the repose is unconstitutional as applied, judgment for defendants was improper; case remanded for further proceedings.

Key Cases Cited

Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 382 A.2d 715 (Pa. 1978) (upheld a 12‑year statute of repose and recognized legislative authority to alter common‑law remedies)
James v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 477 A.2d 1302 (Pa. 1984) (applied heightened review to restrictions on access to courts)
Konidaris v. Portnoff Law Assocs., 953 A.2d 1231 (Pa. 2008) (discussed limits of Remedies Clause and prior quid‑pro‑quo approach)
Ieropoli v. AC&S Corp., 842 A.2d 919 (Pa. 2004) (Article I, §11 bars legislative extinguishment of already‑accrued causes)
Nicolaou v. Martin, 195 A.3d 880 (Pa. 2018) (describes discovery rule tolling for accrual of malpractice claims)
DeYoung v. Providence Med. Ctr., 960 P.2d 919 (Wash. 1998) (invalidated an 8‑year medical‑malpractice repose as insufficiently related to insurance‑cost goals)
Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985) (critique of arbitrary exceptions to repose statutes)
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (U.S. 1996) (explains burden on proponent under intermediate scrutiny)