Yamada v. Weaver
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38358
D. Haw.2012Background
- Plaintiffs challenge Hawaii's campaign finance laws in light of Citizens United and related precedent.
- The court previously issued injunctions on § 11-358 as applied to Yamada and Stewart’s contributions to AFA-PAC, which only engages in independent expenditures.
- Plaintiffs seek to invalidate or limit Hawaii provisions addressing noncandidate committees, expenditures, electioneering disclosures, and government-contractor campaign prohibitions.
- A Hawaii noncandidate committee (A-l) is registered and seeks to engage in candidate-related speech without burdens of disclosure or registration.
- The court confronts whether Hawaii’s regime—especially the noncandidate committee definition, its disclosures, and the contractor-contribution ban—survives First Amendment scrutiny as applied.
- The decision grants in part and denies in part cross-motions for summary judgment, permanently enjoining § 11-358 as applied to AFA-PAC while upholding other challenged provisions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Constitutionality of § 11-358 as applied to independent-expenditure groups | Yamada/Stewart contend contributions to AFA-PAC should be unregulated as independent-expenditure groups. | State argues contribution limits can address corruption/appearance relevant to those groups. | Unconstitutional as applied; injunction against § 11-358 remains. |
| Validity of Hawaii's noncandidate committee and expenditure definitions | A-l argues broad, vague reach on issue advocacy; major-purpose test misapplied. | Court should narrow to express advocacy/its functional equivalent; no overbreadth. | Survives under narrowing construction; facial challenges rejected. |
| Constitutionality of electioneering-communication disclosures and related advertising disclaimer | Disclosures and disclaimer requirements chill speech or are vague. | Disclosures serve informational interests and are permissible under exacting scrutiny. | Facially and as-applied challenges rejected; disclosures upheld. |
| Constitutionality of government-contractor ban on contributions (HRS § 11-355) as applied to A-l | Ban unreasonably restricts speech by a government contractor with no direct link to corruption. | Ban serves anti-corruption interest; closely drawn to prevent appearance of pay-to-play. | Constitutional as applied; ban upheld. |
| Standing to challenge disclosures, noncandidate-committee regime, and contractor ban | Plaintiffs have imminent injuries even if no current violations; pre-enforcement standing present. | Standing exists under Article III for pre-enforcement First Amendment challenges. | Standing established; court proceeds to merits. |
Key Cases Cited
- Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1976) (Constitutional limits distinguish contributions vs. expenditures; safe harbor concepts.)
- Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (S. Ct. 2010) (Independent expenditures cannot be limited by anti-corruption rationale; disclosure allowed.)
- SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Supports disclosure and limits on groups with only independent expenditures.)
- Human Life of Washington v. Brumsickle, 624 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2010) (Upheld disclosure constraints; clarifies nonmajor-purpose PAC regulation.)
- City of Long Beach v.bo?, 603 F.3d 684 (9th Cir. 2010) (Anti-corruption rationale cannot justify limits on contributions to independent-spending groups.)
- Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, 645 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2011) (Applied closely drawn scrutiny to contributions vs. expenditures post-Citizens United.)
- Barland v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 664 F.3d 139 (7th Cir. 2011) (Contribution limits to groups with independent expenditures invalid under certain analyses.)
- Ognibene v. Parkes, 671 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2012) (Supports anti-corruption/appearance rationale and broad contractor-contribution bans.)
- Garfield v. Connecticut, 616 F.3d 196 (2d Cir. 2010) (Upheld contractor-contribution ban as closely drawn to anti-corruption interest.)
- McKee v. Rhode Island (First Circuit), 649 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2011) (Affirms narrowing interpretations of ‘influence’/ambiguity to avoid vagueness.)