Xilena M. Caceres v. McCalla Raymer, LLC
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 12141
| 11th Cir. | 2014Background
- Caceres received a letter from McCalla Raymer stating she owed $269,786.81 on a reverse mortgage and that McCalla represented the lender; the letter was the first communication from the firm.
- The letter included a 30‑day dispute statement but said the debt would be "assumed valid by the creditor" if not disputed, instead of the statutory "assumed valid by the debt collector."
- The letter provided payment contact information, stated it was "for the purpose of collecting a debt," and referenced a lawsuit and caption only fleetingly; a foreclosure suit was filed three days later.
- Caceres sued under the FDCPA, alleging the letter violated § 1692g(a) (validation notice requirements) and § 1692e (prohibiting false or misleading representations).
- The district court dismissed, reasoning (1) the letter was not an "initial communication" because it related to foreclosure and fit an exception, and (2) any statutory deviation was not misleading to the least sophisticated consumer.
- The Eleventh Circuit reversed the first ground and affirmed on the second: the letter was an initial communication but was not misleading under the least‑sophisticated‑consumer standard, so dismissal was affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the letter was an "initial communication" under § 1692g | The letter was the first contact and should trigger validation‑notice requirements | The letter related to foreclosure and fell within the statutory exception for formal pleadings/foreclosure‑related communications | Court: Letter is an initial communication; it is not a formal pleading and sought to collect a debt |
| Whether the letter's phrasing ("assumed valid by the creditor") was false, deceptive, or misleading under § 1692e | The misstatement could mislead the least sophisticated consumer into believing post‑30‑day dispute rights or consequences differed | The wording conveys the same practical implication as the statutory language; any error was nonsubstantive and not misleading | Court: Although the statement deviated from the statute, it would not mislead the least sophisticated consumer; no FDCPA violation |
Key Cases Cited
- Romea v. Heiberger & Assocs., 163 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 1998) (broad view: communications that convey debt information and aim to induce payment fall under the FDCPA)
- Reese v. Ellis, Painter, Ratterree & Adams, LLP, 678 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir. 2012) (letters relating to secured‑debt enforcement can be attempts to collect a debt under the FDCPA)
- Jeter v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 760 F.2d 1168 (11th Cir. 1985) (adopted least‑sophisticated‑consumer standard for misleading communications)
- LeBlanc v. Unifund CCR Partners, 601 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2010) (clarifies objective bounds of the least‑sophisticated‑consumer test)
- Greco v. Trauner, Cohen & Thomas, L.L.P., 412 F.3d 360 (2d Cir. 2005) (addressed similar validation‑notice wording and reached a like result by different reasoning)
- Gburek v. Litton Loan Servicing LP, 614 F.3d 380 (7th Cir. 2010) (explicit demand for payment is not required for a communication to be an initial validation notice)