Wynn v. Vilsack, 3:21-cv-00514

Background

Plaintiff Scott Wynn, a white Florida farmer, sued USDA officials challenging Section 1005 of the American Rescue Plan Act, which authorized debt relief for "socially disadvantaged farmers and ranchers" (SDFRs) defined by race/ethnicity.
Judge Marcia Morales Howard granted a nationwide preliminary injunction halting Section 1005 payments, holding Wynn showed irreparable harm from being excluded, but framed the injunction as preserving the status quo.
The case was stayed pending the Miller class action (in which Wynn was a class member); Congress later repealed Section 1005 via the Inflation Reduction Act, mooting the constitutional claim.
Wynn timely moved for EAJA attorneys’ fees seeking $127,709.05; the Government opposed, arguing Wynn was not a "prevailing party" and that the Government’s defense was substantially justified.
The magistrate judge recommended denying the EAJA fee request, concluding Wynn was not a prevailing party because the injunction preserved the status quo and, alternatively, the Government’s position was substantially justified.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Wynn is a "prevailing party" under the EAJA	Wynn contends the first preliminary injunction enjoining Section 1005 nationwide makes him a prevailing party.	Government argues the injunction only preserved the status quo, provided no enduring relief, and thus did not materially alter legal relations.	Denied — injunction preserved status quo and did not materially alter legal relationship; Wynn not a prevailing party.
Whether the Government's position was "substantially justified"	Wynn implies government lacked reasonable basis to defend Section 1005's constitutionality.	Government argues defending a congressional statute is presumptively reasonable and had a factual/legal basis warranting defense.	Held for Government — on balance Jean factors favor substantial justification; defense was reasonable.
Whether the EAJA fee award should be ordered despite mootness/repeal	Wynn argues prior injunction and litigation efforts justify fees even if statute later repealed.	Government argues repeal and lack of enduring relief undercuts prevailing-party status and fee entitlement.	Court declined EAJA award; mootness/repeal did not supply prevailing-party status.
Whether fee reasonableness or special circumstances preclude award	Wynn sought lodestar fee amount; primary threshold is entitlement first.	Government contends entitlement lacking; also asserted substantial justification.	Not reached on lodestar or special-circumstances because entitlement denied (and alternatively Government substantially justified).

Key Cases Cited

Jean v. Nelson, 863 F.2d 759 (11th Cir.) (articulates non-exhaustive Jean factors to assess whether the government's position was substantially justified under the EAJA)
Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (supreme court standard: "substantially justified" means reasonable to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person)
Sole v. Wyner, 551 U.S. 74 (defines "prevailing party" touchstone as material alteration of the parties' legal relationship)
Tex. State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782 (material alteration test for prevailing-party status)
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (fee awards must be reasonable)
Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home v. West Virginia Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598 (principles on prevailing party and fee-shifting statutes)
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (race-based governmental action is subject to strict scrutiny)
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (explains strict scrutiny standard for race-conscious measures)
Markham v. Int'l Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, 901 F.2d 1022 (11th Cir.) (preliminary injunction not necessarily a prevailing-party basis where relief only preserves status quo)
Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 554 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir.) (example where preliminary relief materially altered legal relations and supported prevailing-party status)