496 F.Supp.3d 1224
S.D. Ind.2020Background
- On May 6, 2020, Dreasjon Reed was pursued by IMPD officers, live-streamed the chase on Facebook, parked and fled on foot; Officer De'Joure Mercer deployed a taser, Reed fell, convulsed, and Mercer then fatally shot him; another officer (Scott) made a recorded comment about a "closed casket."
- Plaintiff Demetree Wynn sued individually and as personal representative of Reed's estate against the City of Indianapolis, the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (IMPD), Chief Randal Taylor, Deputy Chief Kendale Adams, Officer Mercer, and Officer Steven Scott, asserting federal § 1983 and multiple Indiana state-law claims (excessive force, failure to train/Monell, wrongful death, battery, IIED, NIED, denial of medical care, indemnification, respondeat superior).
- Defendants moved under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss a number of claims: all claims against IMPD; claims against certain individual officers (Taylor, Adams, Scott); state-law IIED, NIED, wrongful death as to some officers; and the indemnification/respondeat-superior counts.
- The Complaint alleges municipal policy/training failures and that pursuit decisions by senior officers contributed to Reed’s death; it also alleges Officers Mercer and Scott acted within scope of employment.
- The Court evaluated pleading standards (Twombly/Iqbal/Erickson), Monell principles for municipal liability, personal-involvement doctrines for § 1983, and the Indiana Tort Claims Act (ITCA) law‑enforcement immunity and scope‑of‑employment rules.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is the IMPD a proper suable defendant? | IMPD was sued as a defendant in both official and individual capacities. | Municipal departments lack independent capacity to be sued under Indiana law. | IMPD is not a suable entity here; claims against IMPD dismissed and terminated. |
| Do excessive‑force § 1983 claims survive against Chief Taylor, Deputy Chief Adams, and Officer Scott (personal involvement / failure to intervene)? | Taylor and Adams initiated/ignored pursuit‑termination orders and ratified policy; Scott involved in the incident. | No personal participation or presence at shooting; no factual basis for supervisory liability or failure to intervene. | Excessive‑force § 1983 claims dismissed as to Taylor, Adams, and Scott; claim proceeds against Mercer and Monell claim against City. |
| Do ITCA law‑enforcement immunity and scope‑of‑employment bar state‑law claims (IIED, NIED, wrongful death) against individual officers and the City? | Wynn contends officers were sued in individual and official capacities and immunity is not a blanket shield; alleges excessive force exception applies. | Officers acted within scope and are immune; City not vicariously liable where immunity applies. | Officers Mercer and Scott: state tort claims (IIED, NIED, wrongful death) dismissed as to them personally because Complaint alleges scope of employment. IIED against City dismissed (not based on statute‑proscribed conduct). Wrongful death and NIED allowed to proceed against City; claims against Taylor and Adams not dismissed on immunity—scope is disputed and reserved for later. |
| Is the indemnification claim ripe? | Plaintiff seeks declaration City must indemnify officers. | Indemnification depends on established liability and is not ripe pre‑liability. | Indemnification claim dismissed without prejudice as unripe. |
Key Cases Cited
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (pleading standard: plausibility requirement)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (Twombly pleading standard for plausible claims)
- Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (notice pleading principle)
- Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (municipal liability under § 1983)
- Sow v. Fortville Police Dep't, 636 F.3d 293 (Indiana law: police departments lack capacity to be sued)
- Wilson v. Isaacs, 929 N.E.2d 200 (Ind. 2010) (ITCA law‑enforcement immunity does not shield excessive‑force violations)
- Bushong v. Williamson, 790 N.E.2d 467 (Ind. 2003) (ITCA provides substantial immunity for conduct within scope of employment)
- Ball v. City of Indianapolis, 760 F.3d 636 (7th Cir. 2014) (ITCA bars personal suits against employees acting within scope)
- Colbert v. City of Chicago, 851 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 2017) (§ 1983 requires personal involvement)
- Windle v. City of Marion, Ind., 321 F.3d 658 (7th Cir. 2003) (failure to intervene standard for § 1983 liability)