Wynn Loiland And Suzanne Loiland v. State Of Washington
76096-3
Wash. Ct. App.Dec 26, 2017Background
- Early-morning icy conditions led Pedro Lopez to lose control and his pickup to rest on its side on I-5; a WSP sergeant (Alexander) responded, determined occupants were uninjured, and left without marking the vehicle as having been cleared.
- Dispatch sent fire/rescue; firefighter Wynn Loiland arrived unaware WSP had already cleared the scene, exited to mark the vehicle as abandoned, and stood next to the truck.
- Shortly thereafter, Mario Perez lost control at the same location and struck Loiland, causing serious injuries.
- Loiland sued Lopez, Perez, the State (DOT negligent deicing and WSP negligent failure to mark). The trial court granted summary judgment to the State and Lopez based on the professional rescuer doctrine.
- Loiland appealed the State's summary judgment; the court of appeals reviews de novo and affirms, holding the professional rescuer doctrine bars recovery from the State because the State’s alleged negligence helped cause Loiland’s presence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the professional rescuer doctrine bars Loiland's claim against the State | Loiland: Doctrine should not bar recovery because the immediate cause of his presence was Lopez's crash, and any State negligence was independent or intervening | State: Doctrine bars recovery because DOT and WSP negligence contributed to/caused the emergency that required Loiland's response | Held: Doctrine bars recovery; where multiple negligent actors cause the emergency, rescuers cannot recover from those actors who caused or contributed to the need for rescue |
| Whether negligence occurring after the initial accident (DOT failing to deice after Lopez crash) is independent such that the doctrine does not apply | Loiland: Ongoing failure to deice after Lopez crash is separate, independent negligence that created a distinct duty and risk | State: Continuing failure is part of the same causal chain that produced the emergency and thus not an independent intervening act | Held: Post-crash/ongoing negligence does not equate to independent intervening negligence; it still causally contributed to Loiland's presence |
| Whether WSP’s failure to mark the cleared vehicle is independent negligence (did not cause presence) | Loiland: Alexander’s failure to mark did not cause the original crash; he would have responded regardless, so WSP's omission is not the cause of his presence | State: Failing to mark the scene was a cause of Loiland exiting the engine and being in harm’s way; that omission contributed to the emergency risk | Held: WSP’s omission was a causal contributor to Loiland’s presence and exposed him to the same foreseeable roadside hazard; doctrine applies |
| Whether the risk that injured Loiland was a known, assumed risk of his profession | Loiland: The injury (being struck) was not an assumed risk in these circumstances or was caused by an unforeseen/hidden hazard | State: Being struck while performing a roadside rescue is a known, foreseeable risk that professionals assume | Held: Being struck by a vehicle at a roadside accident is a risk inherent to the rescue activity; Loiland assumed that risk, so recovery is barred |
Key Cases Cited
- Maltman v. Sauer, 84 Wn.2d 975 (1974) (establishes Washington professional rescuer doctrine and limitation where hazard is inherent to rescue)
- Beaupre v. Pierce County, 161 Wn.2d 568 (2007) (doctrine does not bar recovery for negligent acts of intervening parties not responsible for bringing rescuer to scene)
- Sutton v. Shuffelberger, 31 Wn. App. 579 (1982) (officer not barred where injured by intervening party whose negligence did not cause officer’s presence)
- Ward v. Toriussen, 52 Wn. App. 280 (1988) (same principle: professional rescuer rule does not relieve parties whose intervening negligence injures rescuer)
- Ballou v. Nelson, 67 Wn. App. 67 (1992) (professional rescuers cannot complain of negligence that created necessity for exposure to typical rescue hazards)
- Apodaca v. Willmore, 306 Kan. 103 (2017) (subsequent negligent acts still barred if they create the same risk that occasioned the rescue)
- Kaiser v. Northern States Power Co., 353 N.W.2d 899 (Minn. 1984) (distinguishable: recognized factual question where a defendant’s act after arrival may materially enhance risk and avoid the rule)