Wylie Cavin Lillian Cavin And Eagle Radiology, PLLC v. Kristin Abbott and William Abbott
545 S.W.3d 47
Tex. App.2017Background
- Kristin (adult daughter) married Bill despite her parents Wylie and Lillian Cavin’s repeated efforts to stop the marriage; the parents continued to subsidize Kristin and remained involved in her life.
- The Cavins sent numerous texts, emails, letters, showed up at Kristin’s workplace and campus, hired a private investigator to follow the couple, and sent disparaging communications to third parties (including healthcare providers), accusing Bill of mind‑control, mental illness, and abuse.
- A physical altercation between Kristin and Wylie occurred in Feb. 2014; Kristin alleged physical injury and ongoing medical needs for her tailbone, and pled an assault claim seeking medical expenses.
- The Abbotts sued the Cavins and Eagle Radiology for defamation, conversion, tortious interference, abuse of process, invasion of privacy/intrusion, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and assault, attaching voluminous communications as exhibits.
- The Cavins moved to dismiss under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA). The trial court denied the motion, found most claims were not matters of public concern, treated the assault as TCPA‑exempt, and awarded nominal attorney’s fees; appellants appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Abbott) | Defendant's Argument (Cavin) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Cavins’ statements about mental health/abuse are an "exercise of the right of free speech" under the TCPA (matter of public concern) | Statements arose from a private family dispute and are not matters of public concern; TCPA should not cover private, confidential communications | Statements concern health/safety (mental health, abuse) and thus are communications "in connection with a matter of public concern" under the TCPA | Court held as a matter of law that communications about mental illness/abuse qualify as TCPA "exercise of the right of free speech" (matter of public concern) |
| Whether Cavins’ lawsuits and subpoenas are an "exercise of the right to petition" | These filings form part of private harassment and cannot be used to shield tort claims | Filing lawsuits and transmitting documents relating to judicial proceedings fit the TCPA definition of petitioning | Court held the Cavins’ suits and subpoenas satisfy TCPA’s "exercise of the right to petition" definition |
| Whether the assault claim is exempt from the TCPA as a "legal action seeking recovery for bodily injury" | TCPA exemption applies because assault seeks physical injury damages (medical expenses, pain) | The assault claim alleges bodily injury and medical expense recovery and so is excluded from TCPA | Court held the assault claim is exempt from the TCPA and not subject to dismissal under the Act |
| Whether Abbotts met their burden to avoid dismissal (clear and specific prima facie proof) and whether fees/sanctions were proper | The voluminous pleadings and attached communications suffice to show a prima facie case on non‑assault claims; trial court correctly denied dismissal and awarded fees | Defendants met initial TCPA burden; Abbotts failed to link specific evidence to each essential element by clear and specific evidence, so non‑assault claims must be dismissed; fee award tied to frivolous motion requires reconsideration on remand | Court held appellants met initial burden for all non‑assault claims; Abbotts failed to present clear and specific evidence on each essential element, so those claims are dismissed; remanded for determination of TCPA attorney’s fees/sanctions and reconsideration of prior fee award |
Key Cases Cited
- Lippincott v. Whisenhunt, 462 S.W.3d 507 (Tex. 2015) (TCPA definitions cover private as well as public communications; court must apply plain statutory language)
- ExxonMobil Pipeline Co. v. Coleman, 512 S.W.3d 895 (Tex. 2017) (TCPA "matter of public concern" inquiry uses plain statutory definitions and does not require more than a tangential relationship)
- Lipsky v. Kerr, 460 S.W.3d 579 (Tex. 2015) (describing TCPA burden‑shifting framework and the nonmovant’s obligation to present clear and specific evidence)
- Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Cowan, 945 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. 1997) (defining "bodily injury" as physical harm and distinguishing physical from purely emotional injuries)