Wyers v. American Medical Response Northwest, Inc., 360 Or. 211

Background

AMR employed paramedic Haszard, who repeatedly sexually touched elderly or incapacitated patients while transporting them in AMR ambulances. Several victims did not report the incidents at the time.
Prior to discovery of the six plaintiffs’ claims, AMR had received multiple complaints about Haszard (Spain, Whalen, Rotting, Pries, and others), some investigated internally and at least one involving police; AMR conducted limited investigations and took minimal remedial steps.
The six plaintiffs sued under ORS 124.100(5) (vulnerable-person statute) alleging AMR “permitted” Haszard to commit abuse by knowingly acting or failing to act under circumstances in which a reasonable person should have known abuse would occur.
Trial court granted AMR summary judgment, holding ORS 124.100(5) requires actual knowledge of the specific abuse against each plaintiff. Plaintiffs appealed; the Court of Appeals reversed.
The Oregon Supreme Court granted review, construed ORS 124.100(5) to require (1) a defendant knowingly acted or failed to act (knowledge directed to the defendant’s conduct) and (2) those acts occurred under circumstances in which a reasonable person should have known that the same sort of abuse would occur (constructive knowledge of the risk/circumstances).
Applying that construction, the Supreme Court held the record contained genuine issues of material fact about whether AMR knowingly scheduled or permitted Haszard to work under circumstances that a reasonable person should have known would lead to the type of abuse suffered by the plaintiffs; it reversed summary judgment and remanded.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Meaning of "knowingly acts or fails to act" and "should have known" in ORS 124.100(5)	Statute requires liability when defendant acted or failed to act in circumstances where a reasonable person should have known abuse was likely; actual knowledge of the specific abuse not required	Statute requires actual knowledge of the specific abusive conduct; "knowingly" means defendant must have known about the particular abuse	"Knowingly" modifies the defendant’s conduct (quality of act/omission); "should have known" imposes constructive knowledge regarding the circumstances/risk that the same sort of abuse would occur — both elements must be satisfied
Scope of "the physical or financial abuse" — must it be the specific incident?	Applies to the same or similar type of abuse; defendant need not have known of the particular victim’s abuse if circumstances put a reasonable person on notice of that kind of abuse	"The" abuse refers to the specific incident(s) that injured the plaintiff; otherwise statute would be unworkable	The phrase encompasses the same sort of abuse (not only that exact incident). Statute applies where defendant knowingly acted/omitted under circumstances a reasonable person should have known made that sort of abuse likely
Effect of legislative history and intended targets of statute	Legislature intended to protect vulnerable persons broadly (including against negligent institutional actors); constructive-knowledge language is sensible	Legislative history shows focus on individual abusers, not institutions; silence regarding negligence implies narrow reach	Legislative history does not compel defendant’s narrow reading; the statutory text and context support the broader interpretation that can encompass institutional actors absent express exemption
Application on summary judgment	Plaintiffs: prior complaints and substantiated reports create factual dispute whether AMR should have known risk and nonetheless knowingly scheduled Haszard	AMR: lacked actual knowledge of each plaintiff’s abuse; summary judgment proper because statute requires knowledge of specific abuse	Court found genuine issues of material fact (viewing evidence for plaintiffs) about whether AMR knowingly placed Haszard in circumstances where a reasonable person should have known similar abuse would occur; summary judgment was erroneous

Key Cases Cited

Shell v. Schollander Companies, Inc., 358 Or. 552 (evidence to be viewed in light most favorable to nonmoving party on summary judgment)
Chapman v. Mayfield, 358 Or. 196 (summary judgment standard under ORCP 47 C)
Towe v. Sacagawea, Inc., 357 Or. 74 (denying summary judgment where factual disputes for jury)
State v. Gaines, 346 Or. 160 (statutory interpretation principles)
State v. Crosby, 342 Or. 419 (mental-state language is directed toward an object)
State v. Barnes, 329 Or. 327 (knowledge of character/nature of conduct)
State v. Blanton, 284 Or. 591 (knowledge of circumstances can be distinct from knowledge of conduct)
Forest Grove Brick v. Strickland, 277 Or. 81 (constructive knowledge defined)
Moore v. Willis, 307 Or. 254 (distinguishing "knew" from "should have known")
Crimson Trace Corp. v. Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, 355 Or. 476 (express statutory exemptions imply others not intended)