338 Ga. App. 216
Ga. Ct. App.2016Background
- Wright was stopped for speeding, exhibited signs of intoxication on field sobriety tests, admitted drinking, and produced a positive alco-sensor reading; he was arrested for DUI.
- Officer Streeter read the Georgia implied consent notice and asked Wright to submit to a state-administered breath test; Wright agreed and ultimately submitted to an Intoxilyzer test (0.096 g).
- During the interaction Wright asked questions about when he could take another/independent test, asked about a blood test and its cost, and later asked in the patrol car “Where I gotta do my blood test at?”
- Wright moved in limine to suppress the state-administered breath-test results on the ground he requested, but was denied, an independent test; the trial court credited the officer’s testimony that Wright never unambiguously requested an independent test.
- Wright was found guilty of DUI per se and DUI less safe (later merged for sentencing) and speeding; on appeal the court reversed the DUI per se conviction and vacated the DUI less safe verdict due to erroneous admission of the breath-test results, but affirmed the speeding conviction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Wright) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Wright invoked statutory right to an independent chemical test | Wright contends his statements/questions (about a blood test, timing, cost, and location) reasonably could be construed as a request for an independent test | State contends Wright never made an unambiguous request and officer reasonably interpreted his statements as not requesting an independent test | Court held Wright’s statements reasonably could be construed as a request under binding precedent, so the state-administered test should have been suppressed |
| Whether admission of suppressed test results requires reversing DUI per se conviction | Wright argues the breath-test drove the per se conviction and must be excluded | State argues other evidence of impairment supported the convictions | Court reversed DUI per se conviction and held the breath-test evidence inadmissible; acquittal on retrial barred by double jeopardy for that count |
| Whether erroneous admission of the breath-test was harmful to the DUI less safe verdict | Wright argues both DUI convictions should be vacated because per se evidence tainted less safe finding | State argues bench trial judge could disregard inadmissible evidence; conviction for less safe should stand | Court vacated DUI less safe verdict as harmful error because the admitted test result was relevant, noncumulative, and likely contributed to the verdict; State may retry that count |
| Standard for what constitutes a request for an independent test | Wright relies on the “reasonably could be construed” standard from prior precedent to show his ambiguous statements suffice | State urges deference to officer’s on-scene interpretation and that an unambiguous request is required | Court reaffirmed and applied the Ladow/Johnson “reasonably could be construed” standard, but a concurrence questioned its soundness and urged stricter standard |
Key Cases Cited
- Ladow v. State, 256 Ga. App. 726 (establishing that a suspect’s statement that “reasonably could be construed” as a request triggers right to independent test)
- Johnson v. State, 261 Ga. App. 633 (applied the “reasonably could be construed” test where defendant expressed preference for a different test and asked when he could take a chemical test)
- Caffee v. State, 291 Ga. 31 (if state-administered test is excluded, double jeopardy may bar retrial on per se count)
- Allaben v. State, 294 Ga. 315 (discussing effect of reversing one merged conviction on the other merged counts and when to address related challenges)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (standard for sufficiency of evidence)
- Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (explaining the requirement that a request for counsel be unambiguous; cited in concurrence to compare standards)