Wright v. State
347 P.3d 1000
Alaska Ct. App.2015Background
- In 1999 the State filed a felony information in Alaska district court charging Sean Wright with multiple counts of sexual abuse of minors; an arrest warrant issued but was not entered into the national NCIC database.
- Wright left Alaska and lived out-of-state; the State did not extradite or otherwise locate him for almost five years despite avenues to find him.
- In 2004 Wright was arrested after an employer inquiry; he waived extradition and was returned to Alaska, where a grand jury later indicted him on expanded counts.
- Wright moved to dismiss for speedy-trial violations based on nearly five years of pre-arrest delay; the superior court denied relief, finding some blame attributable to Wright and no demonstrated prejudice.
- Wright was tried in 2009, convicted on multiple counts, and sentenced; he also sought jail-time credit for years on electronic monitoring pretrial, which the court denied.
- On appeal the Court of Appeals held the federal Sixth Amendment claim failed (felony information in a court without trial jurisdiction does not trigger the federal right) but found a viable claim under the Alaska Constitution because this court’s precedent treats filing a felony information as triggering the state speedy-trial right; the case was remanded for further findings under the Mouser/Barker factors. The electronic-monitoring credit claim was rejected.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Wright was "accused" for speedy-trial purposes when the felony information was filed in district court | Wright: filing of the felony information triggered his speedy-trial rights under both federal and state constitutions | State: district court information did not trigger Sixth Amendment; only indictment/arrest does | Federal claim denied (Sixth Amendment not triggered); State claim allowed (under Alaska precedent a district felony information triggers state speedy-trial right) |
| Whether pre-arrest, ~5-year delay violated Wright’s Alaska constitutional speedy-trial right | Wright: delay attributable to State; presumptively prejudicial; dismissal required | State: delay partly due to Wright; post-arrest delay and lack of prejudice weigh against relief | Remanded for superior court to apply Mouser/Barker factors considering total pretrial delay (pre- and post-arrest), allocation of blame, defendant assertion, and prejudice; trial court must make new findings |
| Whether the presumption of prejudice from lengthy pre-arrest delay is irrebuttable | Wright: presumption is irrebuttable given length of delay | State: presumption is rebuttable and must be considered with other factors | Presumption of prejudice applies but is rebuttable; court of appeals requires superior court to assess whether presumption was extenuated or rebutted by State |
| Whether Wright is entitled to jail-time credit for electronic monitoring pretrial | Wright: statute prohibiting credit (AS 12.55.027(d)) is ex post facto as applied; or monitoring adopted excessive bail/deprived liberty | State: statute clarifies preexisting law — no credit; monitoring conditions not incarceration | Denied: prior precedent (Fungchenpen) holds statute clarifies existing law; monitoring conditions here not equivalent to incarceration (Matthew), so no credit granted |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Mouser, 806 P.2d 330 (Alaska App. 1991) (Alaska rule that filing of felony information in district court can trigger state speedy-trial right and framework for balancing factors)
- Yarbor v. State, 546 P.2d 564 (Alaska 1976) (Alaska Supreme Court language treating filing of a complaint or an arrest as start of state speedy-trial protections)
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (four-factor speedy-trial balancing test)
- Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992) (presumptive prejudice from excessive delay is part of the Barker mix and is rebuttable)
- United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971) ( Sixth Amendment speedy-trial attaches at arrest or formal charge)
- Lovasco v. United States, 431 U.S. 783 (1977) (pre-indictment delay analyzed under due process; requires proof of actual prejudice)
- United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850 (1978) (pretrial denial of speedy-trial dismissal may be inconclusive; prejudice better assessed after trial)
- Fungchenpen v. State, 181 P.3d 1115 (Alaska App. 2008) (AS 12.55.027 clarifies that electronic monitoring time is not jail-time credit)
- Matthew v. State, 152 P.3d 469 (Alaska App. 2007) (conditions of electronic monitoring not equivalent to incarceration for purposes of due process/jail credit)