Wright v. Semple
696 F. App'x 540
| 2d Cir. | 2017Background
- Plaintiff-appellant Ian Wright, a Connecticut prisoner proceeding pro se, sued state officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging Connecticut’s Risk Reduction Earned Credit (RREC) program and related procedures.
- Wright alleged RREC implementation forced him to attend prison programs or face discipline, which he claimed amounted to an ex post facto increase in punishment.
- He also claimed a due process violation for not receiving a deportation parole hearing and an equal protection violation based on differential treatment of pre- and post-1981 offenders.
- The district court dismissed Wright’s complaint sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; Wright appealed the dismissal.
- Wright argued the district court erred by dismissing with prejudice without giving him leave to amend; the court evaluated whether amendment would be futile.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ex post facto | RREC retroactively increased punishment by forcing unwanted program participation or discipline | RREC directives are regulatory, not punitive; any discipline would be for new infractions | RREC is regulatory and any punitive effect is innocuous; no ex post facto violation |
| Due process (deportation parole hearing) | Denial of a deportation parole hearing violated due process | Wright was not eligible for such a hearing and cites no right to advance notice of request procedures | Claim fails because complaint shows he was not yet eligible |
| Equal protection | RREC treats post-1981 offenders worse than pre-1981 offenders convicted of same crimes | RREC statute does not distinguish pre- and post-1981 offenders | Claim fails; statute applies uniformly and does not create the alleged class-based distinction |
| Leave to amend | Pro se status required at least one chance to amend before dismissal with prejudice | Amendment would be futile because plaintiff isn’t entitled to requested relief | Dismissal without leave was harmless; amendment would be futile, so dismissal affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Larkin v. Savage, 318 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2003) (standard of review for sua sponte § 1915A dismissal)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility pleading standard)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (requirements for factual pleading and reasonable inference of liability)
- Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2011) (special solicitude for pro se complaints)
- Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990) (ex post facto clause prohibits retroactive increase in punishment)
- Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) (distinguishing regulatory from punitive measures for ex post facto analysis)
- Lee v. Governor of the State of New York, 87 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 1996) (insufficiently serious punitive effects are innocuous for ex post facto purposes)
- Shomo v. City of New York, 579 F.3d 176 (2d Cir. 2009) (pro se complaints should get leave to amend if any indication a valid claim might be stated)
- Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2000) (no leave to amend when amendment would be futile)