Wright v. Illinois Department of Children & Family Services
798 F.3d 513
| 7th Cir. | 2015Background
- Margaret Wright, a long‑time Illinois DCFS caseworker, was ordered to undergo fitness‑for‑duty psychiatric evaluations after an incident involving a ward (CPL) and critical reports from CPL’s treating psychiatrist and DCFS supervisors.
- DCFS ordered evaluations, charged Wright with insubordination for refusing, suspended her 15 days, placed her on desk duty at times, and contemplated further discipline; Wright filed grievances.
- Wright continued managing a full caseload for a period after the first evaluation order; DCFS testimony indicated the usual practice was to restrict duties when ordering an evaluation.
- Wright retired shortly after receiving an insurance bill that referenced a leave/suspension notation and after learning she could take an early (reduced) pension; she claimed constructive discharge under the ADA stemming from the evaluation orders.
- At the first trial (Wright I) a jury found for Wright on the ADA claim (violation of §12112(d)(4)(A)) and constructive discharge but awarded no damages; the district court denied JMOL on ADA but ordered a new trial because the constructive‑discharge jury instruction was legally flawed.
- On retrial (Wright II) the district court granted DCFS’s JMOL motion on constructive discharge, finding Wright failed to prove that DCFS’s conduct made termination imminent or that working conditions were objectively intolerable; the Seventh Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether ordering Wright to undergo a fitness‑for‑duty exam violated ADA §12112(d)(4)(A) (i.e., was it job‑related and consistent with business necessity?) | Wright: the order was pretextual; DCFS sought out the psychiatrist’s concerns and did not follow its usual practice (e.g., restricting duties), so no objective business necessity existed. | DCFS: objective reports (Dr. Costa’s order/letter and staff complaints) provided a reasonable belief of impairment or risk, so the exam was job‑related and necessary. | Affirmed district court denial of JMOL — a reasonable jury could find genuine dispute whether the exam served a business necessity (inconsistent application of policies and continued case assignments created material factual dispute). |
| Whether the constructive‑discharge jury instruction (Wright I) correctly stated the law | Wright: the instruction’s phrase “reasonably believes” preserves the correct objective standard. | DCFS: instruction was acceptable; focus on employee belief is permissible. | New trial properly granted — instruction unduly emphasized the employee’s subjective belief rather than whether the employer’s conduct would have communicated to a reasonable employee that termination was imminent. |
| Whether Wright established constructive discharge on retrial (Wright II) | Wright: disciplinary process and communications (including insurance notice) made termination imminent and working conditions intolerable, so retirement was involuntary. | DCFS: no final decision to terminate; process was ongoing, restrictions were reasonable; retirement was a unilateral decision not caused by intolerable conditions. | JMOL for DCFS affirmed — evidence did not show termination was imminent or working conditions objectively unbearable; mere prospect of discharge or pending process is insufficient. |
Key Cases Cited
- EEOC v. Univ. of Chicago Hosps., 276 F.3d 326 (7th Cir. 2002) (Type II constructive discharge requires employer conduct that would communicate to a reasonable employee that termination is imminent)
- Chapin v. Fort‑Rohr Motors, Inc., 621 F.3d 673 (7th Cir. 2010) (constructive discharge requires intolerable working conditions; greater showing than hostile‑work‑environment claim)
- Cigan v. Chippewa Falls Sch. Dist., 388 F.3d 331 (7th Cir. 2004) (prospect of discharge from an extended process, without interim undermining, does not establish constructive discharge)
- Kodish v. Oakbrook Terrace Fire Prot. Dist., 604 F.3d 490 (7th Cir. 2010) (constructive discharge where employer made immediate termination clear)
- Coffman v. Indianapolis Fire Dep’t, 578 F.3d 559 (7th Cir. 2009) (psychiatric inquiries permissible when objective concern for safety exists; employer’s objective evidence matters)
- Conroy v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 333 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2003) (burden on employer to show fitness exam is vital to business, not mere expediency)