Wrenn v. District of Columbia
864 F.3d 650
| D.C. Cir. | 2017Background
- D.C. enacted a "good-reason" concealed-carry licensing scheme that allows licenses only for applicants who show a “special need for self-protection” or another specified reason (e.g., job-related need to carry cash/valuables). Regulations further narrow what counts as a good reason.
- Plaintiffs (Wrenn; Grace and Pink Pistols) were denied licenses for lacking the required special-need showing and sought preliminary injunctions challenging the law under the Second Amendment.
- Two district courts reached opposite results: one denied Wrenn’s injunction; another granted Grace a preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of the law against everyone. The D.C. Circuit consolidated the appeals.
- The panel analyzed whether public carry for self-defense lies within the Second Amendment’s core and whether the good-reason law is a permissible regulation or a categorical denial of the right.
- The majority concluded the law functions as a near-total ban for ordinarily situated, law‑abiding citizens and therefore is invalid under Heller without applying tiered scrutiny; it ordered permanent injunctions against enforcement.
- A dissent argued the core right is possession for self-defense in the home, that the good-reason rule burdens only out‑of‑home conduct and so should receive intermediate scrutiny and deference to the District’s public‑safety judgments.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does the Second Amendment’s core protect public carrying of common firearms for self‑defense? | Plaintiffs: Yes — the Amendment’s text and history protect bearing (carry) beyond the home for self‑defense. | D.C.: No or limited — the core is home-centered; public carry, especially in dense urban areas, falls outside core protection. | Held: Yes — core includes carrying common arms for self‑defense beyond the home (subject to longstanding restrictions). |
| Do historical traditions (e.g., Northampton or surety laws) remove public carry from the Amendment’s protection? | Plaintiffs: No — Heller’s historical analysis shows the mature Founding-era right protected public carry; Northampton/surety laws do not foreclose it. | D.C.: Yes — historical statutes and practices allow limiting carry in populated places and requiring special need. | Held: No — history, as read in Heller, supports public carry; Northampton and surety precedents do not displace the core right. |
| Is the D.C. good‑reason law a permissible regulation subject to intermediate scrutiny or a categorical prohibition requiring Heller’s categorical treatment? | Plaintiffs: The scheme is effectively a categorical ban on ordinarily situated citizens and should be invalidated without tiered balancing. | D.C.: It is a licensing condition or hurdle (not a ban) and should get intermediate scrutiny. | Held: The law is a de facto total ban for most residents and must fall under Heller’s categorical rule; invalidated without applying tiers. |
| Remedy at the preliminary-injunction stage: Should plaintiffs prevail on the merits? | Plaintiffs: Yes — likelihood of success is clear because the law destroys ordinary citizens’ ability to carry. | D.C.: No — factual disputes and public‑safety interests counsel denial or intermediate review. | Held: Plaintiffs met the merits prong; the court vacated the district orders and remanded with instructions to enter permanent injunctions against enforcement. |
Key Cases Cited
- District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (recognized an individual right to possess and carry weapons for self‑defense and condemned a total ban on handgun possession in the home)
- McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (incorporated the Second Amendment against the states and emphasized self‑defense in the home as central)
- Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Heller II) (established a two‑step framework for Second Amendment review and discussed levels of scrutiny)
- Heller v. District of Columbia, 801 F.3d 264 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Heller III) (addressed other D.C. gun regulations and recognized public‑safety interests; cited by dissent for deference)
- Kachalsky v. Cty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2012) (upheld New York’s good‑reason regime using intermediate scrutiny; treated public‑carry limits as regulable)
- Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013) (applied intermediate scrutiny to Maryland’s permit scheme and emphasized historical limits on public carry)
- Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426 (3d Cir. 2013) (upheld New Jersey’s licensing regime without full historical analysis; applied intermediate scrutiny)
- Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012) (struck down Illinois’s near‑total ban on public carry and affirmed that public carry is protected by the Second Amendment)
- Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (divided court; majority upheld CA concealed‑carry rules in context of broader regulatory regime; historical analysis debated)
- Palmer v. District of Columbia, 59 F. Supp. 3d 173 (D.D.C. 2014) (district court decision striking down D.C.’s prior carrying ban and prompting the Council’s good‑reason regime)