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167 F. Supp. 3d 86
D.D.C.
2016
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Background

  • Plaintiffs (three individuals and the Second Amendment Foundation) challenge D.C.’s concealed-carry licensing scheme, targeting (a) its "may-issue"/permissive structure and (b) the statutory/regulatory "good reason/other proper reason" requirement for concealed-carry licenses.
  • D.C. law allows the Chief of Police to issue a two-year concealed-carry license if an applicant shows "good reason to fear injury…or any other proper reason" and is a "suitable person." Regulations require evidence of specific threats or certain employment to satisfy those criteria.
  • Plaintiffs allege denials (or futility of applying) under the good-reason requirement and seek a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of that requirement against them and requiring issuance of licenses to applicants meeting objective criteria (e.g., suitability, residency).
  • A prior preliminary injunction issued by another judge was vacated by the D.C. Circuit for procedural assignment defects; the case was reassigned and the present motion for preliminary injunction followed full briefing.
  • The district court assumed, without deciding, for the injunction-stage analysis that the Second Amendment protects public carry, but applied intermediate scrutiny to the challenged provisions and concluded Plaintiffs had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits.
  • The court denied the preliminary injunction: Plaintiffs established irreparable harm (alleged constitutional deprivation) but failed to show likelihood of success, that equities tipped in their favor, or that an injunction was in the public interest.

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument Defendant's Argument Held
Whether D.C.’s permissive "may-issue" licensing and "good reason" requirement violate the Second Amendment Wrenn: the may-issue discretion plus good-reason predicate unlawfully restricts public-carry rights D.C.: the scheme advances public safety and crime prevention; discretion and criteria are lawful Court: assumed public-carry is protected but held Plaintiffs failed to show likelihood of success; intermediate scrutiny applies
Appropriate level of scrutiny for public-carry licensing Plaintiffs: may favor strict scrutiny or treat law as prior restraint Defendants: intermediate scrutiny is appropriate; prior-restraint doctrine inapplicable Court: applied intermediate scrutiny (following D.C. Circuit and other Circuits)
Applicability of prior-restraint or "rationing" doctrines to good-reason regimes Plaintiffs: licensing is an unconstitutional prior restraint or unlawful rationing of rights Defendants: prior-restraint is a First Amendment doctrine inapplicable here; scheme is not unlawful rationing Court: rejected prior-restraint and rationing arguments as inapplicable or unpersuasive
Whether the District’s evidence and fit satisfy intermediate scrutiny Plaintiffs: scheme cannot survive any heightened scrutiny; insufficient deference to legislature D.C.: public-safety and crime-prevention are important interests and the rules are substantially related to them; offered evidence and legislative record Court: Plaintiffs failed to rebut Defendants’ evidence or show the scheme is unlikely to survive intermediate scrutiny; factor favors Defendants

Key Cases Cited

  • District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (Sup. Ct. 2008) (recognizes individual right to possess firearms for self-defense in the home)
  • Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (adopts two-step Second Amendment framework; intermediate scrutiny in some contexts)
  • Heller v. District of Columbia, 801 F.3d 264 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (applies intermediate scrutiny and discusses means-ends review for gun regulations)
  • Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2012) (upholds "proper cause" public-carry requirement under intermediate scrutiny)
  • Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426 (3d Cir. 2013) (upholds New Jersey "justifiable need" requirement; applies intermediate scrutiny)
  • Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013) (upholds Maryland "good and substantial reason" permit rule under intermediate scrutiny)
  • Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012) (struck down Illinois’s flat ban on public carry; distinguished from may-issue schemes)
  • Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7 (Sup. Ct. 2008) (sets the standard for granting preliminary injunctions)
  • Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 290 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (describes how alleged constitutional violations relate to irreparable-harm and preliminary injunction analysis)
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Case Details

Case Name: Wrenn v. District of Columbia
Court Name: District Court, District of Columbia
Date Published: Mar 7, 2016
Citations: 167 F. Supp. 3d 86; 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28362; 2016 WL 912174; Civil Action No. 2015-0162
Docket Number: Civil Action No. 2015-0162
Court Abbreviation: D.D.C.
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