Wray v. City of Greensboro, 2017 N.C. LEXIS 558

David Wray was Chief of Police for the City of Greensboro (promoted to Chief in 2003) and resigned in January 2006 after internal disputes.
Three lawsuits (Fulmore, Hinson, Alexander) named Wray for actions alleged to have occurred in his official capacity; Wray requested the City defend and indemnify him but the City refused.
In 1980 the City adopted a Resolution/City Policy (pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 160A-167) declaring a policy to provide defense and payment of judgments for officers/employees acting within scope of employment, except for fraud, malice, or wanton conduct; the policy vests decision-making with the City Manager and City Council.
Wray sued the City in state court seeking declaratory relief and reimbursement of his defense costs (~$220,593.71); the City moved to dismiss asserting governmental immunity and failure to state a claim.
The trial court dismissed with prejudice holding governmental immunity was not waived; the Court of Appeals (majority) reversed, concluding Wray pleaded a contract-based waiver of immunity; the City appealed to the Supreme Court of North Carolina.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals: Wray sufficiently pleaded a contract claim (employment/contractual obligation to provide defense), which implies waiver of governmental immunity and thus survives a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal; the Court did not decide the contract’s merits.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether municipal governmental immunity bars Wray's claim for reimbursement of defense costs	Wray alleged that his employment relationship (and the City Policy) created a contractual obligation obligating the City to defend/indemnify him, so immunity is waived	City argued governmental immunity bars the suit and that §160A‑167 or the City Policy does not waive immunity or create a contractual right to compel defense/indemnity	The Court held that alleging a valid contract claim (employment obligation to pay defense costs) is sufficient to plead waiver of governmental immunity and to survive a 12(b)(6) dismissal; merits unresolved
Whether the complaint met the Rule 12(b)(6)/notice‑pleading standard to state a contract claim	Wray argued his factual allegations (employment history, acting within scope of employment, City Policy, requests for defense, City refusal, damages) satisfy notice pleading for a contract claim	City argued the complaint failed to plead an express/valid contract or contract terms creating an enforceable reimbursement right, so dismissal was proper	The Court applied de novo review and concluded the complaint met the low notice‑pleading threshold; factual sufficiency for contract formation remains for later proceedings

Smith v. State, 289 N.C. 303 (holding that when the State enters into a valid contract it implicitly consents to be sued on that contract)
Blackwelder v. City of Winston‑Salem, 332 N.C. 319 (discussed limitation that §160A‑485 confines waiver in tort contexts by purchase of insurance)
Whitfield v. Gilchrist, 348 N.C. 39 (municipalities waive immunity when they enter into valid contracts)
Evans ex rel. Horton v. Housing Auth., 359 N.C. 50 (sovereign immunity principle: State immune from suit absent waiver)
Arnesen v. Rivers Edge Golf Club & Plantation, Inc., 368 N.C. 440 (standards for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6))