327 F. Supp. 3d 105
D.C. Cir.2018Background
- Catherine Woytowicz, a part‑time GWU professor and union member, was investigated in 2016–2017 under GWU’s Title IX/Consensual Relationships policy after a student complaint; the investigation included proposed informal resolution, written reprimand, and eventual denial of certain teaching appointments.
- GWU’s Title IX coordinator, Rory Muhammad, and administrators (Dept. Chair Michael King, Vice Dean Eric Arnesen, and Vice Provost Christopher Bracey) handled the review; Muhammad concluded no sexual harassment but found a Consensual Relationships policy violation and recommended informal resolution; university leaders issued a written reprimand and barred reappointment to some courses.
- Woytowicz sued in D.C. Superior Court alleging First and Fifth Amendment violations (via Bivens), a §1985 conspiracy claim, breach of contract (CBA, Title IX policy, and a separate teaching agreement), D.C. Human Rights Act claims, and intentional infliction of emotional distress; defendants removed and moved to dismiss.
- Key legal disputes: whether GWU and its employees were state actors for constitutional claims; whether §1985 applies absent state action; whether the CBA claim is preempted by §301 LMRA and exhausted; and whether the court should retain supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims.
- The district court dismissed all federal claims (Bivens, §1985) for failure to allege state action, dismissed the CBA breach claim as LMRA‑preempted and unexhausted, and remanded the remaining D.C. statutory and common‑law claims to D.C. Superior Court.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether GWU/employees are state actors so Bivens/Fifth/First claims lie | GWU performed a governmental function by investigating Title IX complaints, was regulated and funded by federal government, and acted under OCR requirements | Private university/employees are not government actors; Title IX regulation/funding and OCR oversight do not convert routine university investigations into state action | Not state actors; constitutional/Bivens claims dismissed |
| Whether §1985(3) conspiracy claim can proceed against private actors | Even if private, alleged government "involvement" and conspiracy to deprive constitutional rights suffices | §1985 requires state action/involvement when the predicate constitutional right requires it; no state action pled here | §1985 claim dismissed for failure to plead governmental action/involvement |
| Whether breach of Collective Bargaining Agreement is viable given LMRA §301 | Woytowicz initially alleged CBA breach but attempted to withdraw in briefing; claims arise under CBA | Defendants: CBA breach is preempted by §301 and plaintiff failed to exhaust contractual grievance/arbitration procedures | CBA breach claim cannot be withdrawn via brief, is §301‑preempted and dismissed for lack of exhaustion |
| Whether court should keep supplemental jurisdiction over remaining D.C. law claims | Woytowicz urged sufficiency of DCHRA and state common‑law claims | Defendants urged dismissal/submission in federal court | Court declined supplemental jurisdiction and remanded remaining D.C. statutory and common‑law claims to D.C. Superior Court |
Key Cases Cited
- Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (established implied damages cause of action against federal officers for constitutional violations)
- Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001) (Bivens remedy does not extend to suits against entities)
- Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (distinguishing private actions from exclusive public functions)
- Rendell‑Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982) (extensive regulation and public funding do not alone make private actor a state actor)
- Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982) (state action requires sufficiently close nexus; mere approval/acquiescence insufficient)
- Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988) (actions that depend on CBA interpretation are governed by §301 LMRA)
- Scott v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 463 U.S. 825 (1983) (§1985 claims vindicate rights found elsewhere; state action requirement applies when predicate right requires it)