Worthy-Pugh v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company
664 F. App'x 20
| 2d Cir. | 2016Background
- LaQuisha Worthy-Pugh (pro se) appealed the district court’s dismissal of multiple claims against Deutsche Bank arising from a Connecticut strict foreclosure judgment.
- Worthy-Pugh’s claims included: (I) the foreclosure judgment was void ab initio, (II) extrinsic fraud (mortgage-foreclosure fraud) seeking damages, (III) theft of funds, (IV) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (V) to quiet title, and (VI) slander of title.
- The Connecticut Superior Court had previously entered a strict foreclosure judgment against Worthy-Pugh.
- The district court dismissed the claims; Worthy-Pugh timely appealed and also challenged denial of reconsideration.
- The Second Circuit reviewed jurisdictional and preclusion issues (Rooker–Feldman and res judicata) and the sufficiency of the emotional-distress pleading.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether federal court had jurisdiction to invalidate the state foreclosure judgment (claims I, V, VI) | Worthy-Pugh argued the foreclosure judgment was void (obtained by fraud) and federal court could void it | Deutsche Bank argued Rooker–Feldman bars federal review of state-court judgments | Rooker–Feldman applies; claims I, V, VI are barred for seeking review of the state judgment |
| Whether claim for extrinsic fraud/damages (claim II) was barred by Rooker–Feldman | Worthy-Pugh asserted fraud and sought damages and/or relief | Deutsche Bank argued either Rooker–Feldman or preclusion barred the claim | Rooker–Feldman did not bar a damages claim in principle, but the claim was precluded by res judicata under Connecticut law |
| Whether res judicata bars fraud/damages claim | Worthy-Pugh argued extrinsic fraud and "newly discovered evidence" excused preclusion | Deutsche Bank argued prior strict-foreclosure proceeding permitted litigating fraud counterclaims; thus claim was precluded | Connecticut law permits fraud counterclaims in strict foreclosure; Worthy-Pugh had opportunity to litigate, so res judicata bars claim II |
| Whether intentional infliction of emotional distress claim was plead sufficiently | Worthy-Pugh alleged conduct causing severe distress | Deutsche Bank argued allegations did not meet Connecticut’s high standard for extreme, outrageous conduct or severe distress | Dismissal affirmed: allegations fail to plausibly allege conduct beyond societal bounds or distress so severe no reasonable person could endure |
Key Cases Cited
- Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (Rooker–Feldman jurisdictional doctrine)
- Rooker v. Fidelity Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (foundational Rooker case)
- McKithen v. Brown, 626 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. test for Rooker–Feldman application)
- Vossbrinck v. Accredited Home Lenders, Inc., 773 F.3d 423 (2d Cir. — foreclosure-judgment/fraud context and limits of Rooker–Feldman)
- Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75 (preclusion: state-judgment preclusive effect in federal court)
- Morgera v. Chiappardi, 813 A.2d 89 (Conn. App. Ct. — defendants may assert fraud counterclaims in strict foreclosure)
- Watts v. Chittenden, 22 A.3d 1214 (Conn. standard for intentional infliction of emotional distress)
- Appleton v. Bd. of Educ. of Town of Stonington, 757 A.2d 1059 (conduct must exceed bounds tolerated by decent society)
- Squeo v. Norwalk Hosp. Ass’n, 113 A.3d 932 (severity threshold for emotional distress under Conn. law)