Worster v. Gauvreau, 06-02078

Albert and Judith Gauvreau filed a joint Chapter 7 petition; Worsters oppose discharge under § 727(a)(2)(A).
Judith and Albert deeded jointly held real estate to Albert alone in December 2004 (within a year before filing).
State court awarded JudIth Gauvreau $92,048.50 in May 2005 for embezzlement and related fraud; judgment later amended.
Gauvreaus defaulted and filed a joint Chapter 13 petition; later converted to Chapter 7; BAPCPA changes did not apply.
Worsters allege the December 2004 transfer was a fraudulent transfer intended to defraud them as creditors.
The court must decide whether Albert’s conversion of joint property to sole ownership constitutes a § 727(a)(2)(A) transfer.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Is the December 2004 transfer a 'transfer' under § 727(a)(2)(A)?	Worsters: transfer diminished debtor's property to hinder creditors.	Gauvreaus: no transfer of Albert's property; he gained no diminution.	No; transmutation did not transfer Albert's property.
Did Albert's act qualify as actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors?	Worsters: intentional to defraud Worsters by isolating Judith’s interest.	Gauvreaus: intent shown but not a 'transfer' of debtor property.	Intent proven but no transfer; discharge否
Can res judicata or issue/claim preclusion apply to pre-bankruptcy state court judgment?	Worsters: state judgment should preclude this action.	Gauvreaus: preclusion may apply but issues differ; not identical.	Preclusion does not bar the discharge objection here.
Does actual fraud require a transfer of the debtor’s own property to be actionable under § 727(a)(2)(A)?	Worsters: any transfer, including concealment, qualifies if within one year.	Gauvreaus: only transfers of debtor property count; here Albert's ownership changed but not his own property.	Actual fraud requires transfer of debtor property; not satisfied.
Does the case law support treating post-transfer reversals as cures to discharges under § 727(a)(2)(A)?	Worsters: no remedial cures post-transfer within year should save discharge.	Gauvreaus: some authorities allow undoing transfers; others do not.	No cure effects; not dispositive here.

In re Bajgar, 104 F.3d 495 (1st Cir. 1997) (broad reading of 'transfer' under 727(a)(2))
Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Massachusetts (In re Marrama), 445 F.3d 518 (1st Cir. 2006) (requires actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud)
In re Slosberg, 225 B.R. 9 (Bankr. D. Me. 1998) (issue preclusion in dischargeability proceedings)
Fleet Nat’l Bank v. Gray (In re Bankvest Capital Corp.), 375 F.3d 51 (1st Cir. 2004) (preclusion and bankruptcy context guidance)
In re Zembko, 367 B.R. 253 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2007) (actual fraud required under § 727(a)(2)(A))
Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127 (1981) (fraud standard in dischargeability matters)