Worledge v. Riverstone Residential Group, LLC, 350 P.3d 39

Background

Riverstone (and predecessor HSC) managed four Montana apartment complexes owned by Creekside, Wildflower, Shiloh Glen, and 4000 Mullan Road; tenants signed form leases prepared by Riverstone.
Plaintiffs (tenants) sued on behalf of a putative class alleging Riverstone’s leases contained uniform provisions violating the Montana Residential Landlord and Tenant Act and the Security Deposit Act (e.g., cancellation/liquidated-damages clauses, unlawful security-deposit deductions, nonrefundable fees, broad indemnity/attorney-fee provisions).
Plaintiffs moved to certify a Rule 23(b)(3) class; defendants opposed, arguing lack of numerosity, commonality, typicality, adequacy, predominance, and that reply exhibits were new and should be struck.
Plaintiffs submitted a spreadsheet and supporting affidavits with their reply showing which leases contained which challenged provisions; the district court admitted the exhibits, allowed sur-replies, and certified the class.
Defendants appealed certification and denial of their motions to strike; the Montana Supreme Court affirmed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Admissibility of new evidence submitted with reply	Spreadsheet and affidavits were proper rebuttal evidence and unavailable earlier	Reply exhibits were new evidence; admitting them prejudiced defendants and deprived meaningful response	Court: admission not an abuse of discretion because evidence rebutted defendants’ factual challenges, defendants were given sur-reply opportunity, and no demonstrated prejudice
Commonality under M. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2)	Valid common question exists: whether Riverstone’s standard leases contained prohibited provisions; answer will resolve classwide claims	Leases differ; Wal‑Mart tightening requires high commonality showing that plaintiffs cannot meet	Court: commonality satisfied—standard-form leases and uniform letters show a common contention capable of classwide resolution
Typicality and adequacy under M. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3)–(4)	Named plaintiffs’ claims arise from the same course of conduct and legal theory; counsel competent	Some named plaintiffs never lived in every owner’s complex (e.g., Mullan); class representatives lack specific Security Deposit Act injuries	Court: typicality satisfied via juridical-link (common manager, common leases); adequacy satisfied—no antagonism and counsel qualified; addition of new named plaintiffs cured concerns
Predominance & superiority under M. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)	Common legal question (inclusion of prohibited provisions) predominates; damages calculable by statutory formula; class is superior to hundreds of individual suits	Individualized inquiries (damages, whether defendant “purposefully” used prohibited provisions, owner-specific defenses) predominate and make class unmanageable	Court: predominance & superiority satisfied—liability turns on common questions; individual damage calculations and owner-specific timing issues manageable and do not defeat certification

Key Cases Cited

Sieglock v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 319 Mont. 8, 81 P.3d 495 (Mont. 2003) (trial courts have broad discretion on class certification)
Mattson v. Mont. Power Co., 368 Mont. 1, 291 P.3d 1209 (Mont. 2012) (abuse-of-discretion standard and review of Rule 23 findings)
Chipman v. Nw. Healthcare Corp., 366 Mont. 450, 288 P.3d 193 (Mont. 2012) (rigorous analysis; common facts from standardized contracts can support certification)
Wal‑Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (U.S. 2011) (commonality requires a common contention capable of classwide resolution)
Sangwin v. State, 373 Mont. 131, 315 P.3d 279 (Mont. 2013) (distinguishing when individual issues defeat predominance)
Diaz v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 363 Mont. 151, 267 P.3d 756 (Mont. 2011) (typicality ensures alignment of representative and class interests)
McDonald v. Washington, 261 Mont. 392, 862 P.2d 1150 (Mont. 1993) (individual damage calculations do not necessarily preclude class determination)