World O World Corporation v. Marina Safroniy
329512
| Mich. Ct. App. | Feb 21, 2017Background
- In 2005 Yuriy and Marina Safroniy executed a promissory note and mortgage for $13,500 at 11.75% interest (15‑year term) secured by Florida property; both instruments contained acceleration clauses.
- The Safroniys last paid on August 1, 2009, and made no further payments; plaintiff waited until September 12, 2014 to sue and served the complaint on October 30, 2014 (plaintiff’s first demand for full repayment).
- Plaintiff’s complaint sought $29,448.17 (remaining principal plus 18% compound interest); after filings plaintiff submitted an affidavit reducing its damages claim to $20,307.97 (11.75% simple interest).
- Yuriy was personally served but no answer was filed in his name; a default was entered against him for the amount in the complaint. Marina (through counsel) admitted nonpayment and moved for summary disposition on statute‑of‑limitations and usury grounds; plaintiff moved for summary disposition on breach.
- The circuit court denied Marina’s statute‑of‑limitations and usury arguments but entered judgment for plaintiff in the reduced amount ($20,307.97). The court also denied Yuriy’s motion to set aside the default.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether loans installments prior to Oct 30, 2009 are time‑barred under Florida’s 5‑year statute of limitations | Plaintiff treated acceleration as retroactive and sought all missed payments since Aug 2009 | Defendants: each installment accrues its own 5‑year limitations period; plaintiff’s acceleration occurred on service (Oct 30, 2014), so payments due before Oct 30, 2009 are time‑barred | Reversed in part: payments due before Oct 30, 2009 (and associated interest) are time‑barred; judgment must be reduced accordingly |
| Whether plaintiff’s attempt to collect 18% compound interest in the complaint renders recovery of lawful interest barred by Florida usury law | Plaintiff argued its pleading posture did not preclude recovery of interest and later limited recovery to 11.75% simple interest | Defendants argued seeking 18% compound interest in complaint showed usury and should bar interest recovery | Affirmed in part: usury defense fails because the parties’ original agreement was not usurious and the usurious rate was not part of the contract; plaintiff’s concession to 11.75% simple interest was accepted |
| Whether the default against Yuriy should be set aside for good cause and meritorious defense | Plaintiff opposed setting aside; urged default valid and was not excused | Yuriy argued he had meritorious defenses (statute of limitations/usury) and a reasonable excuse for failure to answer | Court did not abuse discretion in denying set aside initially, because Yuriy had notice and offered no adequate excuse; but default must be vacated later to enter a single corrected judgment (see below) |
| Whether equity requires setting aside the default and entering an amended joint judgment after plaintiff reduced its interest claim | Plaintiff maintained original default judgment valid; later amended claim justified separate judgment amounts | Defendants argued it is inequitable for married co‑debtors to be subject to different judgments on a single joint debt after plaintiff reduced its claim | Court: default was properly entered originally but, in equity, the default judgment against Yuriy should be set aside and a corrected joint judgment entered reflecting plaintiff’s reduced damages |
Key Cases Cited
- Dillard v. Schlussel, 308 Mich. App. 429 (discussing summary‑disposition standards)
- West v. General Motors Corp., 469 Mich. 177 (summary‑disposition (C)(10) standard)
- Epps v. 4 Quarters Restoration, LLC, 498 Mich. 518 (standards for setting aside default; attorney/litigant neglect)
- Access Ins. Planners, Inc. v. Gee, 175 So. 3d 921 (Florida rule: statute of limitations on installment contracts accrues separately for each missed payment)
- Greene v. Bursey, 733 So. 2d 1111 (Florida law on limitations for installment contracts)
- Snow v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 156 So. 3d 538 (demand for full balance suffices to accelerate; acceleration date controls limitations)
- Oregrund Ltd. P’ship v. Sheive, 873 So. 2d 451 (usury defense analyzed at contract inception)
- Huntington Nat’l Bank v. Ristich, 292 Mich. App. 376 (equitable relief to set aside default judgment)
