Working Stiff Partners, LLC v. City of Portsmouth, 232 A.3d 379

Working Stiff Partners, LLC owns a four‑bedroom house in Portsmouth’s General Residence A (GRA) zoning district; the owners live in an adjacent home on a different lot.
Plaintiff renovated the house and marketed it on Airbnb/VRBO for daily stays (as short as one day), advertised a daily rate and capacity up to nine guests; occupied ~17% of the year.
City code enforcement issued a cease‑and‑desist, concluding short‑term, daily rentals were not a permitted principal use in the GRA district; Zoning Board of Adjustment upheld the order after rehearing; superior court affirmed and denied injunctive relief.
Central legal question: whether short‑term, daily rentals constitute a permitted “[d]welling unit” principal use under the City zoning ordinance or instead are excluded as “transient occupancies” (e.g., hotels, motels, boarding/rooming houses).
Secondary question: whether applying the ordinance to bar the plaintiff’s use renders the ordinance unconstitutionally vague as applied.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether short‑term, daily rentals are a permitted principal use ("dwelling unit") in GRA	The building meets the ordinance definition of a dwelling unit (provides complete independent living facilities); use does not change by offering short stays	Daily, paid, short‑term rentals are "transient occupancies" (akin to hotels/motels/boarding houses) expressly excluded from the dwelling‑unit definition	Short‑term daily rentals are transient occupancies similar to hotels/motels/boarding houses and thus are not a permitted dwelling‑unit principal use
Whether the ordinance is unconstitutionally vague as applied	Applying the exclusion makes "transient" indeterminate (could include month‑to‑month or nonpermanent tenancies) and allows arbitrary enforcement	The ordinance’s plain meaning plus listed examples gives fair notice; ejusdem generis limits "transient occupancies" to things like hotels/motels/boarding houses	As‑applied vagueness challenge rejected: the ordinance gave fair notice that daily paid rentals are transient; no showing of arbitrary enforcement

Dietz v. Town of Tuftonboro, 171 N.H. 614 (N.H. 2019) (standard of review for ZBA factual findings and trial court review)
Feins v. Town of Wilmot, 154 N.H. 715 (N.H. 2007) (use rules of statutory construction to discern zoning ordinance intent)
Town of Carroll v. Rines, 164 N.H. 523 (N.H. 2013) (construe ordinance language according to common usage)
Severance v. Town of Epsom, 155 N.H. 359 (N.H. 2007) (defined terms in an ordinance govern interpretation)
Dolbeare v. City of Laconia, 168 N.H. 52 (N.H. 2015) (application of ejusdem generis in statutory construction)
MacElman, State v., 154 N.H. 304 (N.H. 2006) (standards for as‑applied vagueness challenges)
Montenegro v. N.H. Div. of Motor Vehicles, 166 N.H. 215 (N.H. 2014) (vagueness doctrine addresses notice and arbitrary enforcement)
In re Justin D., 144 N.H. 450 (N.H. 1999) (due process requires reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited)
Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 (U.S. 1926) (classic statement on vagueness: persons must not have to guess at meaning)
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (U.S. 1972) (vague laws may trap the innocent; clarity required though not perfection)