Wootten v. Virginia, 168 F. Supp. 3d 890

Background

Plaintiff (a public employee) was terminated and requested a post-termination hearing; the Court previously granted Plaintiff partial summary judgment on liability for a procedural due process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and found supervisory liability against Holcomb and Hill; it dismissed Plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation claim.
Defendants Holcomb, Hill, and Thorpe moved for reconsideration challenging the due process liability ruling, asserting qualified immunity, and reasserting supervisory-liability defenses.
Defendants submitted a large appendix of documents and raised new factual and legal arguments not presented at the original summary judgment stage (including state-court materials and deposition excerpts).
The court treated the motion as a Rule 54(b) reconsideration request and emphasized that such motions are disfavored and may only be granted for intervening law, new evidence not previously available, or to correct a clear error to prevent manifest injustice.
The court found Defendants’ motion was an improper attempt to relitigate summary judgment, supplement the record with previously available evidence, and advance new legal theories; it also rejected Defendants’ substantive challenges to the due process and qualified immunity holdings.
The court denied reconsideration and clarified that Defendant Thorpe was not subject to liability on the supervisory-liability claim because that count was not properly pending against her at summary judgment.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether reconsideration of the partial summary-judgment order is proper	Reconsideration should be denied; prior decision stands	Reconsideration sought to overturn due process and supervisory-liability rulings and assert qualified immunity, relying on additional evidence	Denied — motion was improper and mostly rehashed previously available facts and new arguments not timely raised
Whether Plaintiff was entitled to post-termination due process (Liability)	Plaintiff: undisputed record shows termination without required post-termination hearing despite her request	Defendants: Plaintiff waived remedies / chose different grievance path; factual disputes and reliance on state-court filings justify different outcome	Held for Plaintiff — court previously found no genuine dispute and denied reconsideration of that legal conclusion
Whether Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for due-process violation	Plaintiff: right to post-termination hearing clearly established by federal precedent	Defendants: no clearly established right in the specific context; reliance on counsel/other facts support immunity	Denied — qualified immunity rejected; controlling federal precedent establishes post-termination process requirement
Whether supervisory liability applies to Holcomb and Hill	Plaintiff: supervisors liable because constitutional injury occurred and supervisors failed to provide process	Defendants: supervisors not responsible; defenses lumped and no separate analysis previously offered	Held for Plaintiff as to Holcomb and Hill — supervisory liability remains because due-process violation established; Thorpe not liable on Count VI as not properly pending

Key Cases Cited

American Canoe Ass'n v. Murphy Farms, Inc., 326 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 2003) (district court discretion to revisit interlocutory orders)
Fayetteville Inv'rs v. Commercial Builders, Inc., 936 F.2d 1462 (4th Cir. 1991) (district court authority over interlocutory reconsideration)
Madison River Mgmt. Co. v. Bus. Mgmt. Software Corp., 402 F. Supp. 2d 617 (M.D.N.C. 2005) (reconsideration standards and disfavoring relitigation)
Above the Belt, Inc. v. Mel Bohannan Roofing, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 99 (E.D. Va. 1983) (grounds for reconsideration under Rule 54(b))
Sedlack v. Braswell Servs. Grp., Inc., 134 F.3d 219 (4th Cir. 1998) (judicial estoppel test)
Riccio v. County of Fairfax, 907 F.2d 1459 (4th Cir. 1990) (qualified immunity precedent cited by defendants)
Covey v. Assessor of Ohio Cty., 777 F.3d 186 (4th Cir. 2015) (post-termination hearing requirement discussed)
Meyers v. Baltimore Cty., Md., 713 F.3d 723 (4th Cir. 2013) (defining the specificity needed to show a right clearly established)
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) (public-employee property interest and due-process hearing requirement)