589 F.Supp.3d 675
E.D. Ky.2022Background
- Woods sued Standard Fire after an underinsured motorist (UIM) dispute; contractual claims were resolved for Woods on summary judgment, leaving extracontractual (bad-faith) claims for discovery.
- During discovery Woods deposed several Standard Fire employees (Darout, Allen, Green, Pencak); attempts to depose others (Roh, Midkiff) were previously denied.
- Woods served a Rule 30(b)(6) notice with multiple topics (notably Topics 1, 3–5, 7–8, and broadly-worded Topics 9–11).
- Standard Fire sought to satisfy several 30(b)(6) topics by designating prior fact-witness deposition testimony (and to be bound by it) instead of producing an organizational representative; it objected to Topics 9–11 as overly broad and unduly burdensome.
- The magistrate judge addressed (1) whether prior fact-witness testimony may be designated to satisfy a Rule 30(b)(6) notice, and (2) whether specific topics were vague, irrelevant, or disproportional.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a corporation may designate prior fact-witness testimony in lieu of producing a Rule 30(b)(6) representative | Woods raised policy concerns (e.g., "bandying") and warned against allowing parties to evade corporate testimony | Standard Fire argued prior testimony may substitute when timely designated, on-topic, and when a 30(b)(6) would be duplicative, cumulative, or disproportional | Allowed: court adopts a three-part test (timely designation; addresses topic; 30(b)(6) would be unreasonably duplicative/cumulative/disproportionate) and permits designation where met |
| Topic 1 / Topic 5 / Topics 7–8 (specific decisions about setoffs, release demand, payment) — adequacy of designated testimony | Woods contended designated witnesses often answered "I don't know" and that other witnesses (e.g., Parsons) had relevant knowledge | Standard Fire designated testimony of Green and/or Allen and argued those transcripts fully addressed the topics and further deposition would be duplicative | Granted: Designations for Topics 1, 5, 7, and 8 are binding; designated testimony sufficiently addressed topics and further deposition would be duplicative |
| Topics 3–4 (internal assignment/selection of attorneys and how the coverage opinion was routed) — relevance and discoverability | Woods sought information about who assigned the coverage-opinion work and why | Standard Fire argued the internal administrative assignment process is irrelevant and previously disallowed (Roh, Midkiff) | Topic 3 denied (irrelevant and previously excluded). Topic 4 largely rejected as unnecessary; designated Allen/Green testimony treated as binding where offered |
| Topics 9–11 (catch-all: all defenses/arguments in filings; responses to written discovery; all produced documents/records custodian testimony) — breadth and propriety | Woods proposed narrowing Topic 9 to facts underlying specific answer paragraphs and certain affirmative defenses; offered to narrow Topics 10–11 on short notice before deposition | Standard Fire argued Topics 9–11 are overly broad, vague, unduly burdensome, and disproportionate | Mixed: Topic 9 (as narrowed) allowed — Woods may probe factual bases for specified Answer paragraphs and several affirmative defenses. Topics 10 and 11 denied as overly broad and disproportional |
Key Cases Cited
- Edwards v. Scripps Media, Inc., 331 F.R.D. 116 (E.D. Mich. 2019) (permits an organization to designate prior witness testimony in lieu of a 30(b)(6) deposition when timely, on-point, and not disproportional)
- Tri–State Hosp. Supply Co. v. United States, 226 F.R.D. 118 (D.D.C. 2005) (duplication alone is not always a basis to deny a 30(b)(6) deposition; issues can be addressed after deposition)
- McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 185 F.R.D. 70 (D.D.C. 1999) (Rule 30(b)(6) is intended to streamline discovery; overly broad topics defeat that purpose)
- In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 168 F.R.D. 651 (D. Kan. 1996) (cautions against using 30(b)(6) to probe privileged attorney work-product or counsel’s decision-making)
- Radian Asset Assur., Inc. v. Coll. of the Christian Bros. of N.M., 273 F.R.D. 689 (D.N.M. 2011) (discusses split authority on using 30(b)(6) to explore facts underlying legal theories and defenses)
- Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Trustmark Ins. Co., 218 F.R.D. 29 (D. Conn. 2003) (contention-type factual bases may be obtained via deposition and need not be shielded as attorney impressions)