Woodrow v. Astrue, 1:12-cv-03356

Plaintiff Deborah M. Woodrow applied for Title II disability benefits claiming onset September 4, 2007; ALJ held she was insured through March 31, 2008 and could perform past relevant work.
ALJ found severe impairments including sleep apnea, low back pain, restless leg syndrome, IBS and headaches, and assessed an RFC for medium work with postural and environmental limits. At Step 4 the ALJ found she could perform past cashier/assistant manager/receptionist/produce clerk jobs.
Medical records span pre‑accident imaging and treatment (2005–2007), a car accident on September 4, 2007, and intermittent chiropractic and other treatment through and after the date last insured.
After the ALJ decision, plaintiff submitted a treating physician Dr. Reitzenstein’s functional evaluation to the Appeals Council, which incorporated the report into the record but stated it did not provide a basis for changing the ALJ’s decision and provided no analysis of the opinion.
The district court found the Appeals Council implicitly accepted the report as new, material and timely and erred by failing to apply the treating‑physician analysis required for a treating source opinion; the court reversed and remanded for proper consideration of Dr. Reitzenstein’s opinion.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the Appeals Council properly considered a treating physician's opinion submitted after the ALJ decision	Reitzenstein’s report is new, material, relates to the insured period, and the Appeals Council failed to apply 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 treating‑physician analysis	Appeals Council did not review the case substantively and thus its consideration is not separately reviewable	Court: Appeals Council implicitly accepted the evidence into the record and erred by not applying the treating‑physician analysis; remand required
Whether the ALJ properly evaluated Ms. Gerig’s July 2008 Functional Capacity Evaluation	ALJ gave the FCE little weight; plaintiff argues that the FCE should have been credited	Commissioner defends ALJ’s rationale (e.g., evaluator not a physician, was hired to perform FCE)	Court: Declined to decide; remanded because treating‑physician opinion may change analysis
Whether the RFC finding is supported by substantial evidence	Plaintiff argues RFC does not account for limitations shown by evaluations	Commissioner argues substantial evidence supports the RFC	Court: Not reached due to remand ordered on treating‑physician issue

Watkins v. Barnhart, 350 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 2003) (treating‑source opinion standards and factors for weighing medical opinions)
Lax v. Astrue, 489 F.3d 1080 (10th Cir. 2007) (definition of substantial evidence)
Chambers v. Barnhart, 389 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2004) (Appeals Council must consider new, material evidence related to the period on or before the ALJ decision)
Krauser v. Astrue, 638 F.3d 1324 (10th Cir. 2011) (when Appeals Council accepts evidence it becomes part of the administrative record for review)
Fischer‑Ross v. Barnhart, 431 F.3d 729 (10th Cir. 2005) (harmless error applied cautiously in Social Security review)
Martinez v. Barnhart, 444 F.3d 1201 (10th Cir. 2006) (treatment of additional evidence submitted at Appeals Council stage)
Drapeau v. Massanari, 255 F.3d 1211 (10th Cir. 2001) (ALJ must give specific and legitimate reasons to reject treating physician opinion)
Oldham v. Astrue, 509 F.3d 1254 (10th Cir. 2007) (ALJ need not explicitly discuss every § 404.1527 factor but must give reasons that make clear the weight assigned)