Woodard v. State
296 Ga. 803
| Ga. | 2015Background
- On Jan 15-16, 2008 William Woodard (a convicted felon) shot and killed two off-duty DeKalb County police officers during a confrontation after being detained following a visit to an apartment complex; Woodard admitted the shootings but claimed he acted in self-defense/resisted an unlawful arrest.
- Woodard was convicted of malice murder and related firearm offenses; jury recommended life without parole; convictions and sentence affirmed by the trial court and appealed to the Georgia Supreme Court.
- At trial the court instructed the jury on police-citizen encounters, probable cause (including that sensory observations such as odor may support probable cause), and the statutory rule that a person is not justified in using force while committing or fleeing after a felony (OCGA § 16-3-21(b)(2)).
- Woodard did not object to many of those instructions at trial; he later argued on appeal that certain charges lessened the State’s burden to disprove his justification defense and specifically challenged the felony-status exclusion (relying on Heard v. State).
- The Court reviewed (1) alleged instructional error (plain-error standard because no timely objection), (2) whether Heard v. State remained good law, and (3) an ineffective-assistance claim that trial counsel should have objected to the felony exclusion language.
Issues
| Issue | Woodard's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether jury instructions on police duty, probable cause, and detention unlawfully lessened the State’s burden to disprove justification | Jury instructions framed police authority and probable cause too broadly, undermining self-defense/ unlawful-arrest defense | Instructions correctly stated Georgia law; jury still bore the burden to disprove justification beyond a reasonable doubt | No error; instructions proper when read as a whole and consistent with precedent (no plain error) |
| Whether telling the jury that odor and sensory perceptions may establish probable cause equates to saying odor alone establishes probable cause | Court told jurors that odor alone establishes probable cause | Instruction only said senses can inform totality-of-circumstances probable cause | Held not erroneous; court correctly instructed that sensory information is one factor in the totality test |
| Whether OCGA § 16-3-21(b)(2) language (no justification while committing/fleeing after a felony) should not apply to felon-in-possession-type felonies (Heard v. State) | Heard prevents applying the felony exclusion when the underlying felony is mere status (possessing a firearm as a felon) | Heard misread the statute and departed from legislative text; statute applies broadly to felonies | Overruled Heard; court may instruct using the statute’s language; no reversible error in giving the statutory instruction |
| Whether counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to the statutory felony-exclusion instruction | Counsel should have objected under Heard; failure was deficient and prejudicial | Instruction tracked statutory language; after overruling Heard, objection would have been meritless; thus no deficient performance or prejudice | Ineffective-assistance claim fails: no deficient performance because instruction was proper; even under alternative analysis, Woodard did not show Strickland prejudice |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (sufficiency of evidence standard)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (ineffective assistance standard)
- Heard v. State, 261 Ga. 262 (prior rule limiting § 16-3-21(b)(2); overruled)
- Ramirez v. State, 279 Ga. 569 (approving similar instructions on police-citizen encounters)
- Smith v. State, 290 Ga. 768 (discussion criticizing Heard and statutory interpretation)
- Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (probable cause standard)
- O’Keefe v. State, 189 Ga. App. 519 (sensory perception as basis for probable cause)
- Mullis v. State, 196 Ga. 569 (arrest without warrant when offense committed in officer’s presence)