Wood v. Moss
134 S. Ct. 2056
| SCOTUS | 2014Background
- Protesters and supporters assembled on opposite sides of the Jacksonville, Oregon street; President Bush planned to stop for dinner at the Jacksonville Inn.
- Two Secret Service agents directed local police to clear the protesters and move them two blocks away from the Inn to a position beyond weapons reach, while supporters remained in place.
- The protesters later argued the actions violated First Amendment rights and reflected viewpoint discrimination; the district court denied dismissal and the Ninth Circuit reversed, then remanded after amendments alleged an unwritten policy to suppress dissent.
- On remand, amended pleadings alleged the Secret Service acted with a security rationale, and the district court again denied dismissal; the Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial on qualified-immunity grounds.
- The Supreme Court held the agents were entitled to qualified immunity, focusing on whether the officials violated a clearly established First Amendment right given the security context.
- The decision limits liability by requiring a showing that it would have been clear to a reasonable officer that the conduct was unlawful under the circumstances.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the conduct violated a clearly established First Amendment right | Moss argued the move amounted to viewpoint discrimination against protesters. | Agents claimed the security concerns justified different treatment and no clearly established law required equal distance. | Yes; the right was not clearly established for equal access; qualified immunity applies. |
| Whether the Secret Service actions infringed the First Amendment by relocating protesters but not supporters | Displacement targeted disfavored expression; equal access was required. | Security needs justified the relocation and no precedent required equality of positions. | No clearly established requirement to maintain equal positions; security rationale sufficed. |
| Whether the complaint adequately stated a First Amendment claim under Bivens after Twombly/Iqbal | Allegations plausibly showed viewpoint discrimination violating the First Amendment. | The claims lacked plausible factual support for a constitutional violation. | The pleadin g standards were met; qualified immunity analysis governs later steps. |
| Whether officials are shielded by qualified immunity given the security context | The conduct violated clearly established rights regardless of security concerns. | Given Hunter v. Bryant and related decisions, accommodation for reasonable error applies in security contexts. | Yes; the agents were entitled to qualified immunity. |
| Whether there was an unwritten Secret Service policy to suppress dissent attributed to all agents | Alleged unwritten policy from White House coordination showed viewpoint suppression. | No evidence of a policy; cannot infer a policy from isolated misconduct and officials cannot be held liable. | No; the map and security needs undermined the inference of a policy; not liable. |
Key Cases Cited
- Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (government cannot exclude peaceful speakers for disfavored views)
- United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983) (speech rights have limits; timing and manner matter)
- Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) (clearly established inquiry for qualified immunity)
- Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224 (1991) (accommodation for reasonable error in security contexts)
- Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (government may not regulate speech based on content)
- Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (President’s security concerns and limits on speech)
- United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983) (First Amendment contextual limits on access)
- Iqbal v. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (plausibility pleading standard; inferred from context)
