Wood v. Milyard
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 13849
| 10th Cir. | 2013Background
- In 1986 Wood robbed a pizza store and killed the assistant manager; he was convicted after a bench trial of first-degree felony murder, second-degree murder, and other counts.
- Wood’s state direct appeal and state habeas efforts failed; he later filed a federal habeas petition that this court initially dismissed as untimely, but the U.S. Supreme Court reversed on waiver grounds in Wood v. Milyard.
- On remand, Colorado argued Wood procedurally defaulted his double jeopardy and Sixth Amendment jury-waiver claims by not raising them on direct appeal under Colo. R. Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VII).
- The Tenth Circuit held Rule 35’s procedural bar was added in 2004 and therefore could not bar federal review of claims that had to be raised decades earlier; retroactive application would be inadequate under federal habeas procedural-default doctrine and due process.
- On the merits, the court concluded Colorado’s law and the Colorado Supreme Court’s rulings permit only one murder conviction per killing; Wood’s simultaneous convictions for first- and second-degree murder violate double jeopardy and one conviction must be vacated.
- The court conditionally granted habeas relief: it instructed the district court to vacate Wood’s first-degree felony-murder conviction (the conviction Wood challenged) unless state courts vacate one of the murder convictions within a reasonable time; Wood’s request for an evidentiary hearing on his Sixth Amendment jury-waiver claim was denied for failure to diligently develop the factual basis in state court.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Colo. R. Crim. P. 35 procedural bar precludes federal habeas review (procedural default/adequacy) | Wood: Rule 35 was adopted after his direct appeal; it was not firmly established or regularly followed when he defaulted, so it cannot bar federal review. | State: Rule 35 requires these claims on direct appeal; Colorado courts have applied it retroactively, so federal review is barred. | The court held Rule 35 could not bar Wood: it was adopted later and retroactive application would be inadequate and raise due process concerns, so procedural default did not preclude review. |
| Whether simultaneous convictions for first- and second-degree murder for one killing violate Double Jeopardy (multiple punishments) | Wood: Colorado law allows only one murder conviction per victim; having both convictions violates double jeopardy and one must be vacated. | State: No double jeopardy problem because Blockburger elements test shows distinct elements; also no additional sentence was imposed so no cumulative punishment. | The court held Colorado Supreme Court precedent establishes only one murder conviction per killing; convictions violated double jeopardy and one conviction must be vacated regardless of sentencing. |
| Which murder conviction to vacate | Wood: He challenged only the first-degree conviction in federal habeas and seeks relief as to that conviction. | State: Argued no meaningful double jeopardy harm or that the judgment effectively reflected a single conviction merged for sentencing. | Court ordered conditional relief: vacate the first-degree conviction (the one challenged) unless state courts within a reasonable time vacate either murder conviction. |
| Whether Wood is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claim that his jury-waiver was not knowing/voluntary due to counsel’s bad advice | Wood: Counsel failed to explain implications; asks evidentiary hearing to develop facts. | State: Wood failed to develop the factual basis in state court, so §2254(e)(2) bars an evidentiary hearing. | The court denied an evidentiary hearing: Wood failed to diligently develop the factual basis in state court and did not rely on new law or an undiscoverable factual predicate. |
Key Cases Cited
- Wood v. Milyard, 132 S. Ct. 1826 (U.S. 2012) (Supreme Court reversed Tenth Circuit on sua sponte statute-of-limitations issue; State waived limitations defense)
- Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (U.S. 1991) (federal habeas doctrine on procedural default, independence and adequacy of state rules)
- Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. 307 (U.S. 2011) (adequacy and independence of state procedural rules for federal habeas)
- Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386 (U.S. 2004) (prudential reasons to respect state procedural defaults)
- Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411 (U.S. 1991) (procedural bar must be firmly established and regularly followed)
- Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. 53 (U.S. 2009) (state courts may not bar review by invoking new procedural rules without adequate notice)
- Spencer v. Kemp, 781 F.2d 1458 (11th Cir. 1986) (retroactive application of procedural rule may fail due process and be inadequate)
- Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (U.S. 1932) (same-elements test for multiple punishments)
- Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359 (U.S. 1983) (double jeopardy protects against multiple punishments)
- Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856 (U.S. 1985) (a conviction alone can constitute punishment because of collateral consequences)
- Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (U.S. 1995) (habeas corpus is an equitable remedy)
- Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420 (U.S. 2000) (§2254(e)(2) diligence requirement for developing state-court factual record)
- Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465 (U.S. 2007) (failure to develop claim in state court shows lack of diligence barring federal evidentiary hearing)
- Cummings v. Evans, 161 F.3d 610 (10th Cir. 1998) (federal courts bound by state supreme court’s determination of legislative intent)
